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ABSTRACT: Benchmarks are metrics that are deeply embedded in the 
financial markets. They are essential to the efficient functioning of the 
markets and are used in a wide variety of ways—from pricing oil to setting 
interest rates for consumer lending to valuing complex financial instruments. 
In recent years, benchmarks have also been at the epicenter of numerous, 
multi-year market manipulation scandals. Oil traders, for example, 
deliberately execute trades to drive benchmarks lower artificially, allowing the 
traders to capitalize on the manipulated benchmarks. This ensures that later 
trades relying on the benchmarks will be more profitable than they otherwise 
would have been. Such manipulative practices have far-reaching and, in 
some instances, destabilizing effects on the financial markets. 
In responding to these benchmark manipulation scandals, regulators have 
relied on the existing anti-manipulation framework, which is based solely on 
ex post prosecution of wrongdoers. The current framework treats benchmark 
manipulation as just another form of market manipulation. But, as more 
benchmark manipulation schemes come to light, they cast doubt on the 
effectiveness of this traditional approach to curbing a modern-day form of 
manipulation. 
This Article provides the first in-depth analysis of the differences between 
benchmark manipulation and traditional forms of market manipulation. 
This analysis demonstrates that regulators cannot adequately address 
benchmark manipulation through ex post enforcement actions alone. In 
failing to recognize how benchmark manipulation differs from traditional 
manipulation, regulators miss a prime opportunity to oversee a key facet of 
the financial markets and safeguard market integrity. By focusing on the 
unique attributes of benchmarks that make them susceptible to manipulation, 
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this Article puts forward a comprehensive prescriptive regulatory framework 
aimed at detecting and minimizing benchmark manipulation, rather than 
merely punishing wrongdoers after the fact.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Benchmarks have quietly become a ubiquitous feature of the financial 
markets.1 A benchmark aggregates market information into a single metric 
that is used as the basis for pricing or valuing financial contracts or 
obligations. More specifically, a benchmark is a price, rate, or index that 
 
 1. DAVID HOU & DAVID SKEIE, LIBOR: ORIGINS, ECONOMICS, CRISIS, SCANDAL, AND REFORM 
2–3 (2014), https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/research/staff_reports/sr667. 
pdf (discussing the use of LIBOR as a common benchmark for the health of financial markets).  
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measures one or more underlying assets, prices, or other data based on a 
formula, value assessment, or market survey.2 Benchmarks are embedded into 
a wide variety of financial contracts—from consumer loans to long-term 
commodity contracts to complex financial derivatives.3 For example, 
derivatives based on the leading interest rate benchmark—the London 
Interbank Offered Rate (“LIBOR”)—have an estimated outstanding notional 
value of $220 trillion.4 Yet many outside the financial markets were unaware 
of benchmarks until the revelation of the LIBOR scandal in 2012.  
When a company or consumer is interested in obtaining a loan, LIBOR 
is one of the primary benchmarks banks and other lenders utilize to set 
interest rates.5 Although it began as a way to estimate borrowing costs among 
banks, non-banks and other market actors have adopted LIBOR extensively 
throughout the financial markets.6 LIBOR is widely referenced in pricing 
derivatives and numerous complex financial instruments, and it impacts 
interest rates applicable to everyday consumer loans—such as student loans, 
auto loans, and mortgages.7 Given that LIBOR undergirds trillions of dollars 
of financial obligations, the presumption is that a central bank or other type 
of governmental agency oversees this benchmark, but this is not the case for 
LIBOR nor most other benchmarks.8 
LIBOR is calculated from the submissions of leading banks estimating 
the rate at which they could borrow funds from other banks.9 But, dating back 
to (at least) 2007, banks such as JPMorgan, Barclays, and UBS—known as 
panel banks—began to exploit their role as input providers to profit from 
derivatives that referenced the benchmark.10 To manipulate the benchmark, 
 
 2. ONNIG H. DOMBALAGIAN, CHASING THE TAPE: INFORMATION LAW AND POLICY IN CAPITAL 
MARKETS 89 (2015); INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS, FINANCIAL BENCHMARKS: CONSULTATION REPORT 
48 (2013), https://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD399.pdf. While the term 
“benchmark” covers a broad range of metrics, it is important to specify the scope of this Article. First, 
the benchmarks analyzed herein exclude those created for public policy purposes such as consumer-
price indices or inflation indices. Second, benchmarks that reflect the value of an investment 
portfolio, such as the Standard & Poor’s (“S&P”) 500, are also outside this Article’s scope. 
 3. See FIN. STABILITY BD., REFORMING MAJOR INTEREST RATE BENCHMARKS 6 (2014), 
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/wp-content/uploads/r_140722.pdf; HOU & SKEIE, supra note 
1, at 2–3. 
 4. FIN. STABILITY BD., supra note 3, at 6.  
 5. Behind the Libor Scandal, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (July 10, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
interactive/2012/07/10/business/dealbook/behind-the-libor-scandal.html.  
 6. See Michael J. De La Merced, Q. and A.: Understanding Libor, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (July 10, 
2012, 10:38 PM), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/07/10/q-and-a-understanding-libor.  
 7. Id.  
 8. See infra Part II.C.  
 9. De La Merced, supra note 6. 
 10. See Understanding the Rate-Fixing Inquiry: The Banks: Global Financial Firms Reach Settlements, N.Y.  
TIMES: DEALBOOK (July 28, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2012/07/16/business/ 
dealbook/20120716-libor-interactive.html?_r=0#/#banks. 
FLETCHER_PP_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 7/11/2017  1:08 PM 
1932 IOWA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 102:1929 
 
panel banks did not report the interest rate at which they could borrow to the 
British Bankers’ Association (“BBA”), the trade association that administered 
LIBOR, as expected; rather, they reported rates based on whether they 
wanted LIBOR to rise or fall, so that their derivatives positions would become 
more profitable.11 The extensive integration of LIBOR into the markets, 
coupled with a dearth of oversight, meant that panel banks were able to earn 
illicit profits from their misdeeds, and the markets and regulators were none 
the wiser until years later.12  
Upon uncovering the LIBOR manipulation scheme, regulators 
worldwide fined all participating banks approximately $14 billion in total13—
a pittance compared to the illicit profits earned throughout the life of the 
manipulation scheme.14 The LIBOR manipulation scandal was expansive, 
impacting trillions of dollars of financial contracts—but, frighteningly, it 
typifies benchmark manipulation. Although the transfer of wealth to LIBOR’s 
manipulators from the markets was significant, the scheme itself was not 
unique.  
Indeed, scarcely had the dust settled when regulators uncovered a similar 
manipulation plot. The benchmark at the center of this scheme was one of 
the primary currency indices: the WM/Reuters foreign exchange 
benchmark.15 Once again, financial institutions responsible for providing 
input data for the benchmark intentionally skewed information they 
submitted to move the benchmark in their favor. This enabled them to profit 
from their financial obligations that referenced the benchmark.16 Similar to 
the LIBOR scandal, the scheme went undetected for nearly six years, and 
regulators imposed relatively weak monetary sanctions to punish those 
 
 11. See The LIBOR Scandal: The Rotten Heart of Finance, ECONOMIST (July 7, 2012), www.economist. 
com/node/21558281. 
 12. See James O’Toole, LIBOR Scandal: Explaining the Libor Interest Rate Mess, CNN: MONEY 
(July 10, 2012, 12:07 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2012/07/03/investing/libor-interest-rate-
faq/index.htm. 
 13. Jamie McGeever & Katharina Bart, UBS Falls on $8 Billion Estimate in FX Fine Research 
Report, REUTERS (June 12, 2014, 8:27 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/banks-fx-fines-
idUSL5N0OT2I320140612 (stating UBS will pay $8 billion in Libor fines and that other banks 
had already paid $6 billion).  
 14. See Tom Osborn, Is Libor in Its Death Throes?, FIN. NEWS (Oct. 31, 2011), http://www. 
efinancialnews.com/story/2011-10-31/libor-death-throes; Matt Taibbi, Everything Is Rigged: The Biggest 
Price-Fixing Scandal Ever, ROLLING STONE (Apr. 25, 2013), http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/ 
news/everything-is-rigged-the-biggest-financial-scandal-yet-20130425. 
 15. See Daniel Schäfer et al., Regulators Slap $4.3bn Fines on Six Banks in Global Forex Probe, 
FIN. TIMES (Nov. 12, 2014, 7:44 PM), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/aa812316-69be-11e4-9f65-
00144feabdc0.html#slide0; infra Part III.B. 
 16. See Liam Vaughan et al., Traders Said to Rig Currency Rates to Profit off Clients, BLOOMBERG 
(June 12, 2013, 1:06 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-06-11/traders-said-to-
rig-currency-rates-to-profit-off-clients.  
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involved.17 These two examples are not exceptional. In recent years, there has 
been a spate of benchmark manipulation schemes—additional reports have 
come to light involving the manipulation of benchmarks linked to oil,18 
gold,19 natural gas,20 precious metals,21 and even milk.22 With each new 
scandal, U.S. financial regulators have responded with investigations, fines, 
and sanctions, but their reactions have been too little, too late.  
As an aggregation of data, a benchmark provides information on an 
underlying asset that is both deeper and richer than information to which any 
single market actor has access.23 These metrics enhance market efficiency by 
reducing information and transaction costs, because market actors are able to 
rely on the benchmark rather than compiling their own data. Benchmarks 
developed slowly and quietly in the markets as a useful tool to help gauge 
market prices and rates. But parallel regulatory oversight did not accompany 
this development. Consequently, the benchmark industry in the United States 
is entirely unregulated ex ante, despite the importance of these metrics to the 
wider financial markets.24 
Regulators exclusively address benchmark manipulation schemes, if 
discovered, through prosecuting wrongdoers after the fact. The reliance of 
U.S. regulators on after-the-fact enforcement actions stems from their view 
that benchmark manipulation is akin to “traditional” market manipulation.25 
In sum, the current regulatory approach is one in which benchmarks are not 
 
 17. Schäfer et al., supra note 15. 
 18. Justin Scheck & Jenny Gross, Traders Try to Game Platts Oil-Price Benchmark, WALL STREET J. 
(June 19, 2013, 3:01 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324682204578517064 
053636892.  
 19. Madison Marriage, Gold Price Rigging Fears Put Investors on Alert, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 23, 
2014, 8:19 AM).  
 20. Javier Blas, Regulators Probe UK Natural Gas Market, FIN. TIMES (Nov. 13, 2012, 8:41 AM), 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/611cc5c2-2d02-11e2-9211-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3nAIgP74g.  
 21. See Jean Eaglesham & Christopher M. Matthews, Big Banks Face Scrutiny over Pricing of Metals, 
WALL STREET J. (Feb. 23, 2015, 9:26 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/big-banks-face-scrutiny-over-
pricing-of-metals-1424744801?mod=WSJ_hp_LEFTWhatsNewsCollection&cb=logged0.1198023516 
5828723 (discussing the DOJ’s recent commencement of investigations into banks’ potential 
manipulation of gold, silver, platinum, and palladium benchmarks). 
 22. Alison Fitzgerald, Why Dairy Farmers Are in a Sour Mood, BLOOMBERG (May 27, 2010, 4:00 PM), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2010-05-27/why-dairy-farmers-are-in-a-sour-mood.  
 23. See Gabriel Rauterberg & Andrew Verstein, Index Theory: The Law, Promise and Failure of 
Financial Indices, 30 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 13 (2013) (“Indices also ingeniously solve the collective 
action problem of too little information production. . . . Indices obtain private information by 
offering the prospect of liquidity and diversification to induce traders to share it, acting as a 
platform for information trading.”). 
 24. See infra Part II.B.  
 25. See Andrew Verstein, Benchmark Manipulation, 56 B.C. L. REV. 215, 250 (2015) (“The 
United States has followed the traditional common law approach to novel wrongdoing: preserve 
substantial freedom, but create private or public causes of action to hold bad actors accountable 
for their misdeeds.”). 
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subject to prescriptive regulation, and regulators address benchmark 
distortion through ex post remedial measures—a most ineffective 
combination.  
This enforcement-focused approach to market manipulation, including 
benchmark manipulation, stems from efficiency concerns26—given the 
inherent difficulties in identifying manipulation before it occurs, it is 
inefficient to regulate it preemptively. Some argue that prescriptive anti-
manipulation regulation would be at once too broad—capturing legitimate, 
non-manipulative trading—and too narrow—omitting manipulative practices 
that do not fall within the proscribed activities.27 Per this line of reasoning, it 
is better for regulators to address manipulation schemes exclusively by 
prosecuting offenders when and as they arise.  
But, as more benchmark manipulation schemes are revealed, it becomes 
increasingly evident that this ex post approach is insufficient to deter similar 
future misconduct.28 The reason is simply that benchmark manipulation is 
not like other forms of market manipulation, and, consequently, it is not 
responsive to the current ex post regulatory framework. Leaving this industry 
unregulated on an ex ante basis and relying solely on ex post prosecution is 
ineffective because of how benchmarks are produced and used within the 
markets.29 Continued reliance on the current regulatory approach will have 
detrimental consequences on market integrity, efficiency, and—given the 
widespread integration of benchmarks in the markets—stability.  
This Article challenges the current approach to market manipulation as 
it applies to benchmarks, demonstrating that the efficiency concerns 
regarding ex ante manipulation regulation are not valid with respect to 
 
 26. See generally Craig Pirrong, Detecting Manipulation in Futures Markets: The Ferruzzi Soybean 
Episode, 6 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 28 (2004). 
 27. Id. 
 28. See Joel Slawotsky, Reigning in Recidivist Financial Institutions, 40 DEL. J. CORP. L. 280, 
282–87 (2015) (“The current prosecutorial and regulatory regime relevant to financial 
institutional misconduct is broken.”). 
 29. This Article discusses ex ante/prescriptive/preemptive regulation to refer to a 
regulatory framework that outlines, in detail, permissible and/or impermissible activities. As 
such, describing the current framework as ex post simply implies that the rule in place is a broad 
one left to the interpretation of enforcement agencies or prosecutors after wrong-doing has 
occurred. For example, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 broadly prohibits “the use of 
manipulative and deceptive devices” but does not provide much more in detail. Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 § 10, 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2012). The disclosure requirements applicable to 
publicly traded companies, on the other hand, are much more prescriptive in nature. Those 
requirements lay out in great detail who must disclose what and when they must do so. Violation 
of this prescriptive framework is, of course, subject to ex post prosecution, so both ex post and 
ex ante regulation exist together. However, this Article seeks to delineate these two regulatory 
formats.  
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benchmark manipulation.30 Although other scholars and policymakers have 
argued in favor of an enforcement-based regulatory approach to traditional 
market manipulation, this Article argues against sole reliance on the 
enforcement-based regulatory approach to benchmark manipulation. It 
draws a meaningful distinction between traditional market manipulation and 
benchmark manipulation, demonstrating that ex post enforcement actions 
are inefficient to deter benchmark manipulation or regulate benchmarks. 
Furthermore, the lack of government oversight exposes benchmarks to an 
avoidable source of manipulation, much to the detriment of the financial 
markets. 
Benchmark manipulation is possible and profitable because of the 
innately conflicted process that underpins the production of a benchmark. 
All benchmarks are compiled using data contributed by entities that are also 
their primary consumers. The dual and conflicting role these contributor-
consumer entities play in creating benchmarks exposes the metric to possible 
manipulative practices. Other aspects of how industry professionals use 
benchmarks in the market further exacerbate the potential for manipulation. 
These include the widespread integration of benchmarks in the financial 
markets, which amplifies the reach of benchmark manipulation schemes, and 
the importance of benchmark liquidity, which diminishes market discipline 
in the face of manipulation. Because of these features, enforcement actions 
are often inadequate.  
To minimize the impact and likelihood of benchmark manipulation, the 
benchmark industry should be subject to ex ante regulation. This Article puts 
forward a comprehensive, prescriptive regulatory framework for U.S.-based 
benchmarks. The proposed regulatory regime would address the underlying 
motivations of benchmark manipulation, but also grant the benchmarking 
industry much-needed flexibility in self-governance. The Article lays out a two-
tiered self-regulatory format mirrored on the governance approach to stock 
exchanges and futures markets. First, the benchmark industry would form a 
self-regulatory organization (“SRO”) responsible for adopting, implementing, 
and enforcing prescriptive rules. Second, the SRO would be subject to the 
 
 30. See Daniel R. Fischel & David J. Ross, Should the Law Prohibit “Manipulation” in Financial 
Markets?, 105 HARV. L. REV. 503, 518–19 (1991) (arguing that market manipulation is self-
deterring and does not require regulation); Stephen Craig Pirrong, The Self-Regulation of 
Commodity Exchanges: The Case of Market Manipulation, 38 J.L. & ECON. 141, 196–99 (1995) 
(arguing that ex ante regulation is inefficient because of the burdens imposed on the markets); 
Verstein, supra note 25, at 271–72 (arguing against a prescriptive framework for benchmarks 
because of efficiency concerns); see also Steve Thel, $850,000 in Six Minutes—The Mechanics of 
Securities Manipulation, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 219, 296–98 (1994) (contending that market 
manipulation is not self-deterring and must be regulated but through stronger enforcement 
actions). But see Jerry W. Markham, Manipulation of Commodity Futures Prices—The Unprosecutable 
Crime, 8 YALE J. ON REG. 281, 361–66 (1991) (advocating in favor of better defined anti-
manipulation provisions to prevent market manipulation ex ante). 
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oversight of a relevant financial regulator, which could include the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) or the Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission (“CFTC”). The proposed framework would involve the industry 
in its own regulation, allowing for tailored rules that do not stifle innovation 
or hamper efficiency, but also engage government oversight, taking into 
account the importance of this crucial aspect of the financial markets.  
Part II lays the groundwork for the Article’s main claim by discussing 
traditional market manipulation and the reasons for preferring ex post 
enforcement actions for these types of manipulation schemes. Part II also 
introduces the benchmark industry to highlight and explain differences 
between benchmark manipulation and traditional manipulation. Part III 
analyzes three case studies of benchmark manipulation to expound on the 
fundamental features of benchmarks and benchmark manipulation that 
render the industry ill-suited for an ex post regulatory approach. Part IV 
presents justifications both for taking an ex ante approach to regulating 
benchmarks and for employing a two-tiered, self-regulatory model. It also 
proposes a regulatory framework to address the aspects of the benchmark 
industry that make benchmarks susceptible to manipulation. Finally, Part V 
addresses possible critiques of the proposed framework.  
II. MARKET MANIPULATION AND EX POST REGULATION 
Market manipulation is as old as the markets themselves and was the 
impetus for the initial federal regulation of the financial markets.31 
Proscribing manipulation is key to market integrity and efficiency, but the 
expansive financial regulatory framework fails to define “manipulation.”32 As 
one scholar opined, “[m]anipulation is difficult to define . . . . [D]rawing a 
line between healthy economic behavior and that which is offensive has 
proved to be too subjective and imprecise to produce an effective regulatory 
tool.”33 For this reason, lawmakers, courts, and academics routinely differ on 
how to define manipulation and what should constitute manipulation in the 
markets.34 
 
 31. See generally JERRY W. MARKHAM, LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE HISTORY OF FINANCIAL 
MARKET MANIPULATION 14–16 (2014) (discussing market manipulation schemes, in both 
securities and commodities, that led to New Deal Legislation, such as the 1933 Securities Act, the 
1934 Exchange Act, and the Commodities Exchange Act). See infra Part II.B for discussion of 
traditional forms of market manipulation.  
 32. Albert S. Kyle & S. Viswanathan, How to Define Illegal Price Manipulation, 98 AM. ECON. 
REV. 274, 274 (2008) (“Current US law does not explicitly define [manipulation].”). 
 33. Robert C. Lower, Disruptions of the Futures Market: A Comment on Dealing with Market 
Manipulation, 8 YALE J. ON REG. 391, 392 (1991). 
 34. See Fischel & Ross, supra note 30, at 507–12. They argue that market manipulation is 
self-deterring because of the economic impossibilities of buying low and selling high—a necessary 
condition for a successful manipulation scheme. Id. at 547–49. In response, Professor Steve Thel 
refuted the idea that market manipulation was self-deterring and further argued that market 
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The absence of an agreed-upon definition of manipulation has not 
limited regulators’ focus on punishing those who distort the markets for 
personal gain. In 2014, the SEC brought 63 cases alleging market 
manipulation, up from 50 such cases in 2013.35 Rather than wrestle with the 
definitional issues of manipulation, lawmakers broadly proscribe abusive 
trading practices, and regulators prosecuted such actions ex post. Such an 
approach served regulators well as they sought to maintain market integrity 
because of the idiosyncrasies of traditional market manipulation schemes. 
Broad prohibitions against bad behavior coupled with targeted enforcement 
actions, therefore, were the optimal regulatory framework for addressing 
traditional market manipulation without hampering the market’s efficiency. 
Subpart A analyzes the rationale for an ex post approach to traditional market 
manipulation. Afterwards, Subpart B describes traditional market 
manipulation and applies the analysis of Subpart A to demonstrate that the 
limited nature of these schemes justifies an enforcement-only approach. 
A. EX POST REGULATION OF MARKET MANIPULATION 
There is a rich scholarly debate surrounding the optimal form, structure, 
and timing of financial market regulations.36 Modern law and economics 
theory posits that the sole legitimate reason for government regulation is to 
respond to market failure.37 The expansive nature of the financial markets 
means that market failures manifest in distinct ways and the appropriate 
response will differ in accordance with these distinctions and regulatory goals. 
The regulatory goal with respect to market manipulation is straightforward: 
to deter manipulative behavior.38 The question remains as to whether 
regulators should seek to regulate manipulative behavior before it occurs or 
only after the harm has taken place. 
Generally, the timing of regulatory intervention in the financial markets 
depends on four factors: (1) the level of information available; (2) the 
effectiveness and feasibility of sanctions; (3) administrative costs of 
regulation; and (4) the net impact on market integrity, efficiency, and 
 
manipulation was feasible and profitable without employing fraud or fictitious trades. See Thel, 
supra note 30, at 221–24. This debate, however, is beyond the scope of this Article because it is 
specific to “traditional” forms of market manipulation, which differ meaningfully from 
benchmark manipulation. 
 35. SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, YEAR-BY-YEAR SEC ENFORCEMENT STATISTICS, https://www.sec.gov/ 
news/newsroom/images/enfstats.pdf (last visited Apr. 15, 2017). 
 36. See generally Kyle D. Logue, In Praise of (Some) Ex post Regulation: A Response to Professor 
Galle, 69 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 97 (2016). 
 37. Id. at 97. 
 38. Although this is the primary goal of anti-manipulation regulation, in the absence of 
preventing manipulation the laws also seek to compensate manipulation victims and, in some 
instances, prevent wrongdoers from participating in the industry in the future. See Veronica Root, 
Coordinating Compliance Incentives, 102 CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming 2017). 
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stability.39 In weighing these factors, scholars have coalesced, by and large, 
around the notion that the government can best deter market manipulation 
through ex post prosecution of wrongdoers.40 
First, with respect to information, if government regulators have inferior 
information about the conduct they intend to deter—whether about the 
magnitude of harm, nature of wrongdoing, or potential perpetrator—then 
legal intervention should take place after the harm has occurred.41 For 
example, a trader may try to exploit her dominant market position to 
manipulate the market. While this is certainly illegal market manipulation, it 
is difficult to identify market actors who may engage in this form of 
manipulation in the future. If lawmakers tried to enact regulations to prevent 
such manipulation, the rules would necessarily be both over- and under-
inclusive. Therefore, it is better to allow the markets to operate without 
restrictions that would deter legitimate transactions, yet not eliminate 
illegitimate ones,42 and to regulate only when more accurate information is 
available. 
Second, ex post regulation is preferable if sanctions are an effective 
deterrent for undesirable conduct. The effectiveness of sanctions depends on 
whether they can reflect the nature and magnitude of the harm.43 With 
traditional manipulation, there is a high probability that regulators will be 
able to detect the offending conduct once it has occurred and impose the 
necessary fines on the wrongdoers.44 Furthermore, penalties imposed on 
traditional market manipulators after the fact are more likely to reflect the 
level of harm the markets have suffered because of their schemes, thereby 
enabling restitution to victims in certain instances. Ex ante regulation of 
traditional manipulation, therefore, is not preferable because of the difficulty 
in foretelling the level of harm prior to its occurrence.  
Third, the costs associated with intervention must be considered in 
deciding whether regulation ought to be prescriptive or reactive. The analysis 
must weigh the costs of monitoring and policing against the cost of 
investigating questionable conduct after it has occurred. Traditional 
manipulation is, for the most part, easy to detect, so it is unnecessary for 
 
 39. STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 572–78 (2004). 
 40. See Pirrong, supra note 30, at 197–98 (noting how “the nature of manipulation is well 
suited to deterrence through harm-based sanctions”). 
 41. SHAVELL, supra note 39, at 575–76.  
 42. Pirrong, supra note 30, at 196–97.  
 43. SHAVELL, supra note 39, at 576–77.  
 44. See infra Part II.B. This is because traditional market manipulation is transaction-based. 
Attempts to corner or squeeze the markets will be evident from trading volumes in a matter of 
days, in most cases. Jerry Markham, Manipulation of Commodities Price Manipulation: The 
“Unprosecutable” Crime, 8 YALE J. ON REG. 281, 294 (1991) (“The presence and effects of a corner 
also may be revealed by comparison of prices at the close of the delivery month with prices 
immediately thereafter.”).  
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regulators to monitor the markets constantly.45 For example, when the Hunt 
brothers attempted to manipulate the price of silver in 1979, regulators 
became aware of their schemes in a matter of months because of the 
observable impact it had on the price of silver.46 Further, market forces will 
also play a role in detecting and punishing traditional manipulation.  
Lastly, financial regulators are tasked with ensuring the integrity, 
efficiency, and stability of the markets, each of which market manipulation 
negatively impacts. Of these three, manipulation most obviously impacts 
market integrity. If investors do not believe that the markets are fair (i.e., that 
they have integrity), they are unwilling to enter them. Manipulation also 
impacts efficiency to the extent that such conduct results in the markets 
reflecting inaccurate information. Market efficiency depends on the markets 
incorporating accurate information once it becomes available;47 
manipulation impedes this process, making the markets less efficient. 
Manipulation less obviously also impacts market stability. It increases market 
volatility48 which, in turn, can have a destabilizing—even if non-systemic—
effect on the financial markets. Regulators must consider how the regulatory 
tradeoffs they make in one area may impact other areas and whether the 
timing of regulatory intervention is beneficial to the markets as a whole. 
Regarding traditional manipulation, regulators can best accomplish this 
through ex post enforcement actions.  
Traditional market manipulation is well-suited for ex post enforcement 
actions because of the inherent limitations of these schemes. Consequently, 
waiting until regulators expose these manipulative schemes does not 
jeopardize the markets or impose sufficient harm to the markets to warrant 
ex ante regulation.  
 
 45. This is not to imply that traditional manipulation is immediately identifiable; rather, 
that traditional manipulation does not take years, as is the case with benchmark manipulation.  
 46. See generally JEFFREY C. WILLIAMS, MANIPULATION ON TRIAL: ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AND THE 
HUNT SILVER CASE 103–06 (1995) (analyzing the impact of the Hunt brothers’ trading on the 
daily price of silver).   
 47. See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. 
L. REV. 549, 554–59 (1984). 
 48. Benchmark manipulation impacts market stability by negatively impacting market 
forces such that the natural forces of supply and demand are not setting the price of the 
underlying. When the manipulation scheme ends or is revealed, the market’s reaction may cause 
volatility in the market for the underlying as the market seeks to reestablish equilibrium. This can 
result in significant price swings in the underlying. See James O’Toole, Oil-Price Manipulation: The 
Next Libor?, CNN: MONEY (May 17, 2013, 12:17 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2013/05/17/ 
news/economy/oil-price-libor. 
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B. THE LIMITS OF “TRADITIONAL” MARKET MANIPULATION 
“Traditional” manipulation schemes (i.e., non-benchmark 
manipulation) include corners,49 squeezes,50 fictitious trades,51 spoofing,52 
pump-and-dump,53 and certain high-volume trading done to affect prices.54 
Such schemes are generally difficult to proscribe ex ante because lawmakers 
are limited in their ability to craft regulation to outlaw these schemes in a way 
that does not have a net-negative effect on the financial market. At the same 
time, traditional manipulation schemes face certain inherent limitations. 
They are limited in scope because: (1) they target single assets; (2) they are 
capital-intensive and will not be profitable in an informationally efficient 
market; and (3) they are not sustainable long term because regulators can 
detect them quickly. 
A traditional manipulation scheme focuses on distorting the price of a 
single underlying asset, security, or commodity. In the commodities markets, 
this is done through corners or squeezes. In a corner, for example, a trader 
seeks to distort the price of a single asset by gaining and abusing her 
dominance in the market for the asset. The control the trader exerts over the 
underlying asset forces others in the market to transact with her at a 
monopolistic price.55 In the securities market, acquiring a monopoly position 
is almost impossible, but pump-and-dump schemes may have a similar effect. 
In these schemes, manipulators feed false information into the market about 
a given company to distort the price and profit in subsequent sales or 
purchases of the same security.56 The impact of these types of schemes is 
limited to a single asset, and the stability of the financial markets is not 
threatened. Such one-off, non-systemic instances of market manipulation do 
not require a complex system of prescriptive regulation; rather, robust 
enforcement actions are more effective to address these schemes as they arise.  
 
 49. Fischel & Ross, supra note 30, at 549. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 542 n.178.  
 52. Charles R. Korsmo, High-Frequency Trading: A Regulatory Strategy, 48 U. RICH. L. REV. 523, 
548 (2014). 
 53. Id. at 554 n.149. 
 54. Id. at 557. 
 55. See Shaun D. Ledgerwood & Paul R. Carpenter, A Framework for the Analysis of Market 
Manipulation, 8 REV. L. & ECON. 253, 264–65 (2012) (detailing Sumitomo Corporation’s alleged 
cornering of the world copper market). Cornering a commodity is illegal under federal law. See 
7 U.S.C. § 13(a)(2) (2012) (making it a felony for “[a]ny person to manipulate or attempt to 
manipulate the price of any commodity in interstate commerce, or for future delivery on or 
subject to the rules of any registered entity, or of any swap, or to corner or attempt to corner any 
such commodity”).  
 56. See Tālis J. Putniņš, Market Manipulation: A Survey, 26 J. ECON. SURVS. 952, 955–56 
(2012) (describing “pump-and-dump” manipulations).  
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In addition, these manipulation schemes are capital-intensive. Unless a 
manipulator naturally happens to be in a dominant market position,57 she 
must expend significant capital in order to gain a strong enough position in 
the market such that will enable her to influence prices.58 Further, once she 
has established her control over the market, she will have to invest additional 
capital to maintain her position. This includes, for example, additional 
purchases in order to maintain market dominance, storage fees in the case of 
physical commodities, and broker fees in the case of futures, options, or stock 
transactions.59 Consequently, these schemes must hold the promise of 
spectacular profits to be worthwhile, given the significant up-front costs 
required to begin and continue manipulating the asset in order to turn a 
profit.  
Profiting at all from these manipulative trades is questionable. Professors 
Daniel Fischel and David Ross argued that market manipulation is self-
deterring because of the inherent difficulty of buying low and selling high in 
an informationally efficient market.60 Even if a manipulator (1) gains 
dominance in a given asset class forcing others to transact with her and  
(2) pushes prices higher than they otherwise would have been in the absence 
of her manipulative behavior, she still faces an almost certain price decline 
when she sells the asset, which limits her potential profits.61 The manipulator 
needs the asset’s price to remain artificially high to profit from her 
manipulation, but once she begins selling it, prices will decrease to reflect its 
true price. Therefore, the manipulator must find a way to dispose of the asset 
without causing the price to decrease—a difficult feat given the laws of supply 
and demand.62 Because the market naturally imposes limitations on 
traditional schemes, regulatory resources are best used to punish wrongdoers 
after the fact, rather than seeking to ferret out such behavior on an ex ante 
basis.  
Lastly, these schemes are limited in terms of their lifespans. Traditional 
manipulation schemes are unsustainable long term not only because of the 
 
 57. This may be possible because of crop shortages or overproduction of a given 
commodity, but neither is commonplace nor likely if market forces are allowed to operate freely.  
 58. See Franklin Allen et al., Large Investors, Price Manipulation, and Limits to Arbitrage: An 
Anatomy of Market Corners, 10 REV. FIN. 645, 659–60 (2006). 
 59. These are the costs of transacting in the market that must be accounted for if a trader decides 
to engage in such manipulative activities. See, e.g., Craig Pirrong, Commodity Market Manipulation Law: A 
(Very) Critical Analysis and a Proposed Alternative, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 945, 954 n.20 (1994) (discussing 
the impact of the cost of deliveries on market manipulation schemes). 
 60. See Fischel & Ross, supra note 30, at 512–19. 
 61. Pirrong, supra note 30, at 144–45 (referring to this problem as “burying-the-body,” i.e., 
the problem of selling to a market that has been starved of a commodity but keeping the price 
artificially high). 
 62. See Benjamin E. Kozinn, The Great Copper Caper: Is Market Manipulation Really a Problem 
in the Wake of the Sumitomo Debacle?, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 243, 258 (2000). 
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capital they require, as discussed above, but also because of the informational 
efficiency of the markets. Market manipulation based on misinformation 
must be believable in order for a manipulator to profit from it. If the market 
can quickly determine that the information is untrue, then those wishing to 
profit from misinformation have a narrow window of time in which to act. 
This has two results in the markets. First, small, less liquid markets, such as 
microcap or penny stock companies, are more susceptible to manipulation 
through misinformation because of the difficulty of verifying information.63 
But this, once again, limits the potential market impact of such manipulative 
schemes to small segments of the market and is unlikely to have market-wide 
effect. Second, although liquid markets may also be victims of information-
based manipulation, doing so requires the manipulators to take extensive 
steps to legitimize the information so that the markets will not disregard it out 
of hand.64 Even then, the impact will be temporally restricted to a few hours 
and limited to a single stock.65 Market actors will uncover the misinformation 
quickly, allowing the market to price the stock accurately.66 
The ability of the markets to detect and respond to traditional market 
manipulation schemes justifies the enforcement-focused regulatory approach 
of U.S. financial regulations. Because these schemes are limited in scope, 
nature, and impact, the absence of an ex ante framework does not negatively 
impact financial markets as a whole, even if they are successful. Practically, 
implementing ex ante regulations to prevent traditional market manipulation 
would be cumbersome, costly, and ineffective.67 From a regulatory standpoint, 
traditional manipulation schemes are best left to market forces to deter bad 
behavior and enforcement actions to punish the undeterred.  
But, as discussed in Part III, the markets have evolved in many ways—
including how wrongdoers accomplish market manipulation. Benchmarks 
have shifted the focus away from manipulation through market dominance 
or easily discredited misinformation to manipulation through the 
 
 63. Microcap Stock: A Guide for Investors, SEC: INVESTOR PUBLICATIONS (Sept. 18, 2013), https:// 
www.sec.gov/reportspubs/investor-publications/investorpubsmicrocapstockhtm.html (stating that 
information on microcap companies is hard to ascertain because of the lack of public filings). 
 64. For example, a manipulator filed a fictitious tender offer from Avon Products, Inc. with the 
SEC’s electronic filing system. News of the pending buyout sent Avon’s stock soaring—rising as high as 
20% above the pre-takeover announcement price. However, not long after the stock price rose, it fell, 
as the markets quickly discredited the false news. While the misinformation campaign impacted Avon’s 
stock, the impact was only temporary, lasting less than a day. See Aruna Viswanatha, In Suit, SEC Says 
Fake Avon Bid Was Work of Bulgarian, WALL STREET J. (June 4, 2015, 9:10 PM), http://www.wsj.com/ 
articles/sec-sues-ptg-capital-others-over-apparently-bogus-avon-products-bid-1433435600. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. See generally Fischel & Ross, supra note 30 (stating that market manipulation, specifically 
what this Article describes as traditional manipulation, is self-deterring and does not require ex 
ante regulation to prevent).  
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fundamental metrics on which the entire financial markets rely. The impact 
of benchmark manipulation, therefore, is not limited in scope, 
implementation, or timing, so an ex post response is ineffectual against these 
modern-day manipulation schemes. Given the noteworthy differences 
between traditional market manipulation and benchmark manipulation, it is 
dubious whether the current enforcement-based regime, which is well-suited 
for the former, is appropriate for the latter. 
Subpart C introduces the benchmark industry as a first step in 
understanding how benchmark manipulation is accomplished in the financial 
markets.  
C. BENCHMARKS IN THE FINANCIAL MARKETS 
Most commodities are priced with reference to a benchmark, which has 
come to represent their de facto price to the markets.68 For example, 
contracts for purchase and sale of most of the world’s crude oil are priced 
according to the Brent Crude Oil Index.69 The rise of benchmarks as key 
market metrics has shifted the focus of would-be manipulators. Given that for 
many markets, benchmarks have come to represent their assets’ prices, 
manipulators no longer seek to manipulate, for example, gold, oil, or corn 
prices; rather, they target the respective benchmarks.  
To better appreciate how wrongdoers can manipulate benchmarks—and 
how this manipulation differs from traditional market manipulation—it is 
necessary to understand how the markets use benchmarks, who is involved in 
their compilation, and how they are created.  
1. Uses of Benchmarks 
Benchmarks provide a comprehensive picture of the price or rate of an 
underlying asset, commodity, or security (collectively, “the underlying”).70 
This results in numerous additional benefits to the financial markets and the 
market for the underlying.71 For one, benchmarks are a rich source of 
information for the underlying and, consequently, enhance market 
transparency and liquidity. As an aggregation of numerous data points into a 
single number, benchmarks reduce or eliminate the need for market actors 
to conduct specific investigations into the market of the underlying. Rather, 
the markets rely on the benchmark as representative of the underlying. With 
each party relying on the same information that neither produced,72 the 
 
 68. Verstein, supra note 25, at 217–18. 
 69. See infra Part III.C. 
 70. See Rauterberg & Verstein, supra note 23, at 2–5 (discussing the importance of Libor as 
a benchmark for investors).  
 71. “Underlying asset” will be shortened to “underlying” throughout the Article.  
 72. As will be discussed infra, each may have contributed to providing the data on which the 
benchmark is based. 
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market for the underlying is more liquid because the parties are able to 
transact more easily.  
Additionally, the markets are more transparent because market actors 
contribute more information to the benchmarks to enhance their accuracy. 
By aggregating the knowledge of the collective markets, benchmarks provide 
information that benefits all market actors. Recent research found that 
benchmarks provide transparency in over-the-counter (“OTC”) derivatives, 
one of the more opaque segments of the financial markets.73 In their research, 
Professor Darrell Duffie and his colleagues found that “[b]y reducing the 
informational disadvantage of ‘buy-side’ market participants relative to 
dealers, benchmarks encourage greater market participation, lower the cost 
of delays associated with ‘shopping around’ for a better price, and improve 
the ability of OTC markets to efficiently match buyers with the most cost-
effective sellers, and vice versa.”74 Benchmarks, therefore, enhance the 
accuracy of the markets and make them more attractive for others to enter, 
further augmenting liquidity.  
Relatedly, banks, issuers, and other market participants use benchmarks 
as contract referents as a way of pricing or valuing financial obligations, most 
notably with derivatives. Indeed, the development of benchmarks and growth 
of derivatives have been symbiotic.75 Derivative contracts rely on benchmarks 
as a pricing mechanism, which allows market actors to hedge against risks 
within the markets.76 Linking these derivatives to a relevant benchmark has 
simplified structuring a financial instrument that addresses the risks 
particular to the underlying. Interest rate derivatives, for example, arose from 
the need of lenders to hedge against the risk of rising interest rates after they 
had made a loan.77 As a means of pricing, most interest rate derivatives 
reference an interest rate benchmark.78 Benchmarks, therefore, allow market 
actors to tailor their derivative products to specific risks by providing 
comprehensive pricing information on the underlying. Furthermore, using 
benchmarks as a price reference reduces the possibility of opportunism on 
the part of either party, which in turn lowers contracting costs and possible 
future adjudication costs.79 
 
 73. See Darrell Duffie & Piotr Dworczak, Robust Benchmark Design 3–5 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. 
Research, Working Paper No. 20540, 2014), http://www.nber.org/papers/w20540.pdf. 
 74. Darrell Duffie et al., In Support of Transparent Financial Benchmarks, VOX (Feb. 16, 2015), 
http://www.voxeu.org/article/transparent-financial-benchmarks. 
 75. Vincent Brousseau et al., The LIBOR Scandal: What’s Next? A Possible Way Forward, VOX 
(Dec. 9, 2013), http://www.voxeu.org/article/libor-scandal-and-reform. 
 76. Gina-Gail S. Fletcher, Hazardous Hedging: The (Unacknowledged) Risks of Hedging with Credit 
Derivatives, 33 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 813, 830–32 (2014).  
 77. See generally id. (discussing the use of derivatives as a way to hedge against risks).  
 78. Rauterberg & Verstein, supra note 23, at 2–5; see also Fletcher, supra note 76, at 824–32 
(defining credit derivatives). 
 79. Rauterberg & Verstein, supra note 23, at 8–12. 
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2. Benchmark Industry 
A key goal of benchmarks is to be representative of the underlying 
markets on which they are based.80 This depends, in significant part, on the 
data the benchmark administrator selects and how it decides to calculate the 
benchmark. While benchmarks vary across markets in how they are compiled 
and who participates in the process, there are three categories of participants 
common to all: input providers, end users, and benchmark administrators.81    
Input providers contribute the information that constitutes the basis for 
the benchmark. Possible data sources range from executed transactions on a 
given platform to estimates from experts in the underlying market.82 The 
representativeness of a benchmark depends in large part on its data source—
the input providers.83 As the foundation of the benchmark, the breadth of 
data contributors correlates to the benchmark’s robustness and its 
susceptibility to manipulation.84 Thus, the greater the number of input 
providers, the less likely benchmark distortion is to occur.85    
At the other end of the production chain are end users, or benchmark 
consumers. The foremost consumers are financial institutions that use 
benchmarks as pricing or valuation tools in financial derivatives. Another 
significant category of benchmark consumers are derivative issuers,86 such as 
banks, insurance companies, hedge funds, and other large actors in the 
financial market.87 Notably, end users and input providers often overlap, as 
entities are more likely to rely on benchmarks that reflect their transactions 
in the market. In many ways, this is unsurprising: Parties use benchmarks to 
reduce information and transaction costs, but they still want the information 
source to reflect their trades, as an indicator of its accuracy. This also means 
that those who use the benchmark have a direct and conflicting interest in it 
to the extent that they are input providers. This conflict is present in all 
benchmarks and is the basis for benchmark manipulation.   
The benchmark administrator intermediates between input providers 
and end users. Administrators compile inputs, calculate benchmarks, and 
disseminate the outputs to end users. They make key determinations such as 
 
 80. DEUTSCHE BÖRSE GRP., THE BENCHMARK INDUSTRY: AN INTRODUCTION AND OUTLOOK 
10–11 (2013). 
 81. Id. 
 82. See FIN. STABILITY BD., supra note 3, at 10 (describing areas in which market participants 
believe they need reference rates). 
 83. See Duffie & Dworczak, supra note 73, at 5. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. DEUTSCHE BÖRSE GRP., supra note 80, at 10. 
 87. See generally John Kiff, What Is LIBOR?: The London Interbank Rate Is Used Widely as a 
Benchmark but Has Come Under Fire, 49 FIN. & DEV. 32 (2012), http://www.imf.org/external/ 
pubs/ft/fandd/2012/12/pdf/basics.pdf. 
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identifying input sources, deciding which inputs to include in the benchmark 
calculation, and choosing whether to weigh inputs differently depending on 
their contributors. Benchmark administrators have significant discretion over 
the benchmark and, by extension, over how the benchmark reflects the 
market.88  
Benchmark administrators are typically private third parties that 
aggregate relevant market data for an underlying based on self-designed 
methodologies. There are two broad categories of benchmark administrators. 
The first are administrators whose primary purpose is to create benchmarks. 
These administrators calculate indices for clients that have subscribed their 
services.89 Price reporting agencies fall within this category of 
administrators—they compile data and produce benchmarks that underpin 
numerous commodities’ markets.90 The second type of administrators 
provide benchmarks as a secondary source of business. This group may 
include exchanges, banks, and trade organizations. LIBOR, for example, 
prior to the discovery of its manipulation, was done under the auspices of the 
British Bankers’ Association (“BBA”), a trade association of banks based in 
London.  
In compiling benchmarks, administrators, regardless of type, must 
grapple with whether and to what extent they will be transparent with their 
methodology, given that the level of discretion they exercise could undermine 
the market’s perception of their benchmarks’ integrity. In order for the 
market to respect and rely on their benchmarks, administrators must provide 
market participants with enough information so that they see the benchmarks 
as truly reflective of the underlying markets. But in making the process 
transparent, benchmark administrators may also expose benchmarks to 
manipulation. Input providers may selectively trade or only provide data that 
they know will be used to bias the benchmarks in their favor. Administrators 
must balance the need for some transparency against the potential 
manipulation that may result from too much transparency. Further, market 
actors may also question benchmark integrity because of an administrator’s 
conflict of interest. Namely, administrators may also be (or have a material 
interest in) end users or input providers. This conflict also exposes 
benchmarks to potential manipulation and is even more problematic because 
of the administrator’s essential role in the benchmark production process.    
The overlapping roles of the three primary participants in the 
benchmark process create significant conflicts of interest that may result in 
market manipulation. As benchmarks have come to replace the price of the 
 
 88. DEUTSCHE BÖRSE GRP., supra note 80, at 10. 
 89. Rauterberg & Verstein, supra note 23, at 25. 
      90.  A prominent example of a price reporting agency is S&P Global Platts—a leading 
commodities benchmark provider. Global Commodity Prices—Assessments & Methodologies, S&P 
Global Platts, http://www.platts.com/price-assessments (last visited Apr. 14, 2017).  
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underlying asset, manipulation of the benchmark is manipulation of the 
underlying, but with none of the limitations attendant to traditional 
manipulation.  
Part III analyzes three case studies of benchmark manipulation to 
demonstrate how this form of market manipulation is dissimilar to traditional 
market manipulation, such that ex post enforcement actions are not enough 
to deter, detect, and meaningfully sanction manipulators.  
III. BENCHMARK MANIPULATION 
Traditional market manipulation is difficult to accomplish because of its 
structural limitations and the ability of the markets to respond and limit its 
impact and viability. These limitations do not, however, similarly affect 
benchmark manipulation, nor are market forces able to mitigate it. Biasing a 
benchmark has a greater market impact than traditional market manipulation 
because of the way in which these metrics are produced and utilized in the 
markets. Unlike attempts to corner the market for an entire commodity that 
require significant outlay of capital, benchmark manipulation may have the 
same impact with little or no investment if input providers distort contributed 
data or administrators exploit their conflicted positions.  
Benchmark manipulation differs in its implementation, scope, and 
market impact from traditional market manipulation schemes because of four 
key characteristics.  
First, benchmarks are innately conflicted because of the overlapping 
roles of contributors, end users, and administrators. By using benchmarks 
while occupying various positions in the benchmark production chain, these 
actors have direct and conflicting interests in the benchmark outcome. 
Exploitation of this conflict is not only feasible, but it can successfully result 
in biasing the benchmark in the manipulator’s favor.  
Second, benchmarks require a level of transparency for the markets to 
“buy in” and become reliant on them. However, once administrators disclose 
information about which inputs they use and how they compile them, data 
providers are able to submit self-interested information to distort the 
benchmark in their favor. This paradox of transparency has serious 
implications for the susceptibility of benchmarks to manipulation.  
Third, benchmarks are broadly integrated into the markets, which 
magnifies the effect of their manipulation. While a benchmark is specific to 
an underlying asset, market actors use them well beyond the present market 
for the underlying. Oil benchmarks do not merely affect the price of oil today; 
rather, they alter the pricing of oil-based derivatives contracts that reference 
the benchmark, as well as any payouts that are valued per the oil benchmark. 
The broad-based integration of benchmarks means that their manipulation 
has significant ripple effects throughout the markets, particularly that of the 
underlying.  
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Finally, market discipline is absent when a benchmark’s underlying 
market is liquid, because the market will not stop using the benchmark even 
if it is compromised. This is especially true when there are no alternatives to 
the benchmark. The market’s inability to exert any influence over a distorted 
but liquid benchmark means that once a benchmark has achieved liquidity, 
market discipline is no longer a credible limitation on bad behavior.  
In the subparts that follow, three case studies are examined in detail to 
demonstrate how these four factors manifest in benchmark manipulation. 
Through these case studies it is apparent that not only is benchmark 
manipulation meaningfully different from traditional manipulation, but, 
importantly, that these differences limit the effectiveness of an ex post 
enforcement-focused regulatory regime. A prescriptive regime, therefore, is 
necessary to address benchmark manipulation.  
A. INTEREST RATE 
Interest rate and related benchmarks are among the most widely used in 
the financial markets91 because they underpin a wide variety of financial 
instruments. Banks first developed interest rate benchmarks because they 
wanted an average interest rate for commercial and interbank loans.92 Since 
their introduction, interest rate benchmarks have dominated the financial 
markets. One study estimated that approximately $300 trillion in notional 
value of derivative contracts are linked to various interest rate benchmarks.93  
The most widely referenced interest benchmarks are those based on 
unsecured interbank borrowing—LIBOR, Tokyo Interbank Offered Rate 
(“TIBOR”), and European Interbank Offered Rate (“EURIBOR”) 
(collectively, the “IBORs”).94 These benchmarks were among the first of any 
industry to be introduced to the markets.95 As a result, the IBORs became the 
leading market standard, used in innumerable financial products to manage 
interest rate risk.  
Interest rate risk is common to most businesses—financial and non-
financial alike—which propelled the IBORs far beyond the interbank 
borrowing market. Creditors routinely used the IBORs to set the rates for 
commercial lending and compute interest rate payments of everyday 
consumers.96 As a representation of the rate at which some of the most secure 
borrowers would be willing to lend to each other, the IBORs were considered 
 
 91. See ROSEMARIE SANGIUOLO & LESLIE F. SEIDMAN, FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS GL.02 (2009). 
 92. Landon Thomas, Jr., Trade Group for Bankers Regulates a Key Rate, BUS. STANDARD (July 9, 
2012), http://www.business-standard.com/article/finance/trade-group-for-bankers-regulates-a-
key-rate-112070900076_1.html. 
 93. FIN. STABILITY BD., supra note 3, at 6. 
 94. Id. 
 95. See Thomas, supra note 92. 
 96. See Kiff, supra note 87, at 32. 
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a useful starting point to determine lending rates between other parties.97 
Consequently, it was not uncommon to see interest rates on consumer loans 
being quoted, for example, as “Libor rate plus 2%.”98  
Administrators calculate the IBORs through a simple process—averaging 
submissions from contributing banks after discarding the highest and lowest 
quartiles.99 Panel banks do not base their submissions on transaction data; 
rather, they submit their estimated cost of unsecured interbank borrowing.100 
The banks that submit inputs for the IBORs are large, international financial 
institutions. For example, input providers for the U.S. Dollar LIBOR between 
2007 and 2010 included JPMorgan, Bank of America, Barclays Bank, and 
HSBC.101 Administrators select panel banks based on their market volume, 
reputation, and expertise in the underlying currency.102 Notably, the IBORs 
were fully transparent—meaning that information regarding the method of 
calculation, source of the inputs, and data provided were completely and 
almost immediately available to the markets.  
The first signs of trouble with the interest rate benchmarks surfaced in 
2008, when the media initially raised concerns regarding U.S. Dollar LIBOR 
calculations. A Wall Street Journal article first questioned whether panel banks 
were misreporting their borrowing rates to conceal growing liquidity issues.103 
However, it was not until the summer of 2012 when Barclays admitted to a 
multi-year manipulation of its LIBOR submissions that the scheme came to a 
 
 97. Id. 
 98. See James O’Toole, LIBOR Scandal: Winners and Losers in Libor Mess, CNN: MONEY (July 
12, 2012, 5:10 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2012/07/12/investing/libor-consumers. 
 99. See MARC HENRARD, INTEREST RATE MODELLING IN THE MULTI-CURVE FRAMEWORK: 
FOUNDATIONS, EVOLUTION AND IMPLEMENTATION 198–200 (2014).  
 100. LIBOR submissions are in response to the specific question: “At what rate could you 
borrow funds, were you to do so by asking for and then accepting inter-bank offers in a reasonable 
market size just prior to 11 am [London time]?” See WHEATLEY REVIEW, THE WHEATLEY REVIEW 
OF LIBOR: INITIAL DISCUSSION PAPER 50 (2012), https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/ 
system/uploads/attachment_data/file/191763/condoc_wheatley_review.pdf. 
 101. Stacey P. Slaughter & Thomas F. Berndt, Interest-Rate Ruse: Understanding the LIBOR 
Scandal, LAW360 (Aug. 15, 2012, 12:28 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/369340/interest-
rate-ruse-understanding-the-libor-scandal.  
 102. See Kiff, supra note 87, at 32; Mike Segar, Libor Lies: 13 Giant Lenders Sued over the 
Benchmark Rate Riggin, RT (Sept. 24, 2013, 2:09 PM), http://www.rt.com/business/jpmorgan-
libor-banks-sued-268. 
 103. Carrick Mollenkamp, Bankers Cast Doubt on Key Rate Amid Crisis, WALL STREET J. (Apr. 
16, 2008, 12:01 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB120831164167818299. Although the 
regulatory inquiries started in the mid-2000s, some claim the manipulation started long before: 
“‘Fifteen years ago the word was that LIBOR was being rigged,’ says one industry veteran closely 
involved in the LIBOR process. ‘It was one of those well kept secrets, but the regulator was asleep, 
the Bank of England didn’t care and . . . [the banks participating were] happy with the reference 
prices.’” ECONOMIST, supra note 11 (alteration in original). 
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head.104 By the fall of 2012, financial regulators in the United States launched 
investigations into the interest rate benchmark submissions of 16 panel 
banks.105 Within the following year, they made similar allegations of 
misconduct against all the IBORs, and investigations followed suit.106  
The IBORs scheme had all the fundamental features of benchmark 
manipulation that renders ex post enforcement actions ineffective. The 
IBORs were deeply, but openly, conflicted. The panel banks—which 
comprised of a small pool of between 12 and 18 banks107—were the primary 
issuers of financial derivatives that referenced the IBORs, giving them a direct 
interest in the rise or fall of the quoted interest rates.108 Participating banks, 
therefore, were able to establish the terms of derivatives and impact their 
ability to profit off of them. And the market knew this. Counterparties to 
derivatives with panel banks were aware that contributing banks were also 
consumers of the IBOR benchmark as product issuers that created and sold 
financial instruments using the IBORs as a referent.109 
The IBORs’ conflict not only stemmed from the standard input 
provider/end user conflict of interest present in all benchmarks, but the fact 
that banking trade associations were the benchmark administrators, 
compounded it.110 These trade associations represented the interests of the 
IBOR panel banks and, therefore, were far from impartial. The response of 
the benchmark administrators when they were notified of possible 
manipulation of the contributed data highlights the effect of this conflict. 
Specifically with respect to LIBOR, regulators put the BBA on notice about 
 
 104. Jean Eaglesham & Max Colchester, Interest Rate Probe Escalates: Barclays Agrees to Pay Record 
Fine; Email Shows Traders Tried to Manipulate Libor, WALL STREET J. (June 28, 2012, 8:06 AM), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304830704577493092589081130. 
 105. Reed Albergotti & Jean Eaglesham, 9 More Banks Subpoenaed over Libor, WALL STREET J. (Oct. 
25, 2012, 11:09 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014240529702038974045780794137428 
64842. 
 106. See Ben McLannahan, Japanese Banks Accused of Tibor Fixing, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 6, 2013, 
2:17 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/792d5b58-7010-11e2-8785-0144feab49a.html#axz 
z3ktgsuG00 (describing how a Tokyo trader accused Japanese banks of price fixing). 
 107. The IBORs were available in different currencies and in each currency for different 
maturity dates. See ICE BENCHMARK ADMIN., ROADMAP FOR ICE LIBOR 5 (2016), https://www. 
theice.com/publicdocs/ICE_LIBOR_Roadmap0316.pdf. The number of panel banks varied for 
each currency and tenor. Id. 
 108. See Darrell Duffie & Jeremy C. Stein, Reforming LIBOR and Other Financial Market Benchmarks, 
29 J. ECON. PERSP. 191, 196–98 (2015) (discussing bank motives for manipulating benchmarks). 
 109. See Sharon E. Foster, Harm to Competition and the Competitive Process: A Circular Charade in the 
LIBOR Antitrust Litigation, 10 BYU INT’L L. & MGMT. REV. 91, 94–95, 104 (2014); ECONOMIST, supra 
note 11 (“[T]hose involved in setting the rates have often had every incentive to lie, since their banks 
stood to profit or lose money depending on the level at which LIBOR was set each day.”).  
 110. The BBA and the Japanese Bankers Association, for example, administered LIBOR and 
TIBOR, respectively. These associations represented the interests of their members and were not 
subject to regulatory oversight of their home countries. 
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questionable submissions as early as 2007, yet it responded weakly.111 On 
learning of allegations that banks were deliberately biasing their LIBOR 
submissions downwards, the BBA wrote letters to the submitters “reminding 
them of the [LIBOR submission] definition and urging them to submit 
accurate rates.”112 When considered as a whole, this meant that the data 
contributors, administrators, and product issuers for the IBORs were the same 
entities—so the IBORs were conflicted at every turn.  
With respect to transparency, the IBORs were the most transparent 
benchmarks in the market.113 The identities of panel banks were known to the 
markets, in addition to each bank’s interest rate submission, which the 
administrator disclosed daily.114 Input providers also knew how administrators 
would calculate their submissions in creating the respective IBORs.115 This 
level of transparency enabled input providers to “game the system” to their 
advantage. Working in collusion, panel banks submitted false inputs 
specifically designed to influence the IBORs’ calculation, ensuring that the 
rate would move in their favor.116 Transparency, therefore, was a double-
edged sword—at the beginning, it bolstered the integrity of the benchmark 
in the markets, but in the end it provided the manipulators with a roadmap 
to maximizing their manipulative practices. In addition, transparency allowed 
panel banks to be so proficient at their manipulative schemes that they were 
able to keep it going for numerous years undetected.  
As discussed above, the IBORs are one of the most-used benchmarks in 
the financial markets. In theory, a benchmark as innately conflicted as any of 
the IBORs should not have had the level of market integration that those 
benchmarks enjoyed. Yet the markets gobbled them up, embedding them 
into contracts with other parties and, more importantly, accepting them as a 
pricing mechanism in their derivative contracts with panel banks in spite of 
the blatant conflicts of interest. The broad integration of IBORs throughout 
the market amplified the expected profits of the manipulators, but with 
significantly less effort than a traditional manipulation would require. A 
derivative contract tied to LIBOR, for example, could net profits in the 
millions for a manipulator. But a single such derivative contract does not 
necessarily limit the manipulator; rather, she may have several such contracts 
with different counterparties. This is exactly what happened with the LIBOR 
 
 111. Gavin Finch & Liam Vaughan, BBA Was Told Banks Lied About Libor to Boost Profits in 2007, 
BLOOMBERG (June 5, 2015, 10:57 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-06-
05/bba-told-banks-were-lying-about-libor-to-boost-profits-in-2007. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Reforming LIBOR: Wheatley Versus the Alternatives, 9 N.Y.U. J.L. & 
BUS. 789, 828 (2013). 
 114. See id. at 823. 
 115. See id. at 797. 
 116. Id. 
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manipulation scheme. The impact of manipulating the IBORs had far-
reaching, market-wide consequences, with some wondering whether there 
would be systemic repercussions for the financial markets.117  
Lastly, the cost of liquidity is readily apparent with respect to the IBOR 
manipulation scheme. Once the media revealed and regulators confirmed the 
IBORs manipulation scheme, the markets did not transition away from these 
benchmarks. Instead, the markets continued to use them because there were 
no alternatives available.118 Because the IBORs were firmly embedded in the 
markets, they had become “basin[s] of attraction,” which meant that they 
were the sole benchmarks of their kind.119 Instruments that referenced the 
IBORs were liquid and standardized, which enhanced their tradability.120 
Consequently, as IBORs-referencing instruments became more liquid, 
financial institutions discarded alternate interest rate benchmarks in favor of 
the IBORs. The benefit of using a more liquid benchmark for the underlying 
meant that if manipulators later compromised the benchmarks, market 
participants had no alternatives. In exchange for the liquidity of the IBORs, 
market actors were irreversibly tied to them even when they no longer 
accurately reflected the underlying market.  
The cost of liquidity, therefore, was the loss of the market’s ability to 
discipline the IBORs through exit. To most market actors, the benefits of 
using a liquid benchmark outweighed the potential losses from its distortions. 
Furthermore, because of the widespread integration of the IBORs, any 
possible threats to abandon them would ring hollow. This is all the more true 
because the primary users of the interest rate benchmarks were the panel 
banks that contributed data for its calculation—banks that stood to profit 
from manipulating the IBORs. In the absence of market discipline, there is 
no natural limit on benchmark manipulation as there is with traditional 
manipulation.121 
The IBORs manipulation schemes are a quintessential example of 
benchmark manipulation. The IBORs were deeply conflicted, and those 
conflicts were the foundation for their manipulation; the transparency 
paradox made manipulating the IBORs more likely; market integration of the 
IBORs amplified the scope of the manipulative scheme exponentially; and the 
IBORs liquidity made market discipline impotent.122 All told, the IBORs 
manipulation was able to continue for approximately five years in no short 
measure because of the absence of regulatory oversight.  
 
 117. See generally id. 
 118. Id. at 846. 
 119. Duffie & Stein, supra note 108, at 195–96. 
 120. See id. at 193 (discussing traders’ preference for high-liquidity). 
 121. Verstein, supra note 25, at 218. 
 122. See Duffie & Stein, supra note 108, at 192–93. 
FLETCHER_PP_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 7/11/2017  1:08 PM 
2017] BENCHMARK REGULATION 1953 
 
B. FOREIGN EXCHANGE 
Analysts consider the foreign exchange market to be “the largest and 
most actively traded . . . in the world,” where daily global trades average 
around $5.3 trillion per day.123 Traders base most of these transactions on the 
WM/Reuters (“WM/R”) Closing Spot Rates (collectively, “the WM/R 
rates”).124 As the most important foreign exchange benchmarks globally, 
market actors use the WM/R rates extensively.125 Fund managers use the 
WM/R rates to calculate the day-to-day values of their portfolios, indices price 
multi-country equities in reliance on them, and counterparties use the rates 
to value trillions of dollars’ worth of derivative and other financial contracts.126 
As the only standardized currency-reference rate, market participants have 
gravitated to the WM/R rates to reduce transaction costs and pricing 
inefficiencies.127  
Unlike the IBORs, administrators base the foreign exchange benchmark 
on actual transactions, not market estimates, executed within a narrow time 
period. Specifically, the WM/R rates are the median of executed foreign 
exchange transactions that occurred 30 seconds before and after 4:00 p.m. 
GMT, known as the “fix window.”128 Additionally, administrators used only 
those trades done on the WM/R platform in the benchmarks’ calculation.129 
These restrictions meant that traders had one minute to execute transactions 
and to do so at a favorable rate.130 This was particularly difficult if traders had 
a large currency position to trade whether for themselves or on behalf of a 
client.131  
The fix window resulted in greater liquidity in the foreign exchange 
market and also increased robust and competitive currency pricing, mostly 
during that 60-second window.132 But it also augmented the possibility of 
manipulators distorting the markets in their favor. In 2012, some market 
participants complained of possible manipulation of the WM/R rate to U.K. 
financial authorities.133 By late 2013, regulators in three different countries 
 
 123. In re Foreign Exch. Benchmark Rates Antitrust Litig., 74 F. Supp. 3d 581, 586 (S.D.N.Y. 
2015). 
 124. See FIN. STABILITY BD., FOREIGN EXCHANGE BENCHMARKS 6 (2014), http://www. 
financialstabilityboard.org/wp-content/uploads/r_140930.pdf (discussing the purpose of the 
WM/R rates). 
 125. The WM/R rates are available for all major international currencies. 
 126. FOREIGN EXCH. PROF’LS ASS’N, FOCUS ON: FOREIGN EXCHANGE BENCHMARKS 2 (2015), 
https://fxpa.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/fxpa-benchmarks-5-22final.pdf.  
 127. See id. at 1.  
 128. Id. at 3. This window was widened to five minutes in 2015.  
 129. Id. at 6.  
 130. See id. at 1.  
 131. Id. at 3. 
 132. See generally id. 
 133. Id. at 4.  
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announced formal probes into whether banks were manipulating the WM/R 
rate.134 In 2015, the six largest banks in the foreign exchange markets reached 
settlement agreements with government regulators for approximately six 
billion dollars in fines.135 
To distort the WM/R rates, traders at different banks discussed their 
orders ahead of the fix window to align their strategies.136 Traders also shared 
information about upcoming client orders to improve the chances of moving 
the benchmark in their favor so they could profit from their clients’ 
transactions. To maximize profit from trading at the fix window, traders 
would enter into transactions ahead of known client orders in order to move 
the benchmark, thereby affecting the exchange rate at which they executed 
them. They would also execute these transactions in installments during the 
one-minute window to exert the most pressure possible on the WM/R rates.137 
Entering into a number of smaller transactions, as opposed to a single large 
trade, had a greater impact on the benchmark because administrators based 
it on the median of transactions.138  
Owing to the sheer size of the market, and that the benchmarks are 
transaction based, analysts considered manipulating the foreign exchange 
markets and the WM/R rates to be a near impossibility.139 In reality, the size 
of the foreign exchange market did not immunize the WM/R benchmarks 
against manipulation, but it did make it attractive to would-be manipulators 
because of the large potential profits. By moving the benchmark in a 
particular direction in anticipation of a client’s order, traders profited 
handsomely off client trades and distorted the currency markets for all market 
participants.140 
Similar to the IBORs manipulation, the WM/R manipulation possessed 
the same four fundamental features that made the benchmarks’ manipulation 
feasible, sustainable, and profitable. Most obvious is the inherent conflict of 
interest. Banks, as input providers, were also the primary consumers of the 
 
 134. Id.  
 135. See, e.g., Press Release, Office of Pub. Affairs, Dep’t of Justice, Five Major Banks Agree to 
Parent-Level Guilty Pleas (May 20, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/five-major-banks-agree-
parent-level-guilty-pleas; Press Release, U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, CFTC Orders Five 
Banks to Pay over $1.4 Billion in Penalties for Attempted Manipulation of Foreign Exchange 
Benchmark Rates (Nov. 12, 2014), http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr7056-14; FIN. 
CONDUCT AUTH., FINAL NOTICE TO ROYAL BANK OF SCOTLAND PLC, CASE NO. 121882, at 1 (2014), 
http://www.fca.org.uk/your-fca/documents/final-notices/2014/royal-bank-of-scotland.  
 136. FOREIGN EXCH. PROF’LS ASS’N, supra note 126, at 4. 
 137. Vaughan et al., supra note 16. 
 138. Id.  
 139. Id. (“Banks are now settling the biggest rate-rigging cases—tampering in the $5.3 trillion-a-
day [foreign] currency market, which was long considered immune because of its sheer size.”).  
 140. See Vaughan et al., supra note 16 (“A move in the benchmark of 2 basis points, or 0.02 
percent, would be worth 200,000 francs ($216,000) . . . .”). 
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WM/R benchmarks. They had contracts with clients for large currency 
positions that depended directly on the WM/R rates, a rate that they were 
able to influence through their own trades. In theory, given the large number 
of traders and transactions, this conflict should not have mattered—a single 
trader should not be able to move the benchmarks. But the foreign exchange 
markets were also deeply concentrated. Four banks controlled over 50% of 
the foreign exchange markets as both input providers and consumers of the 
WM/R benchmarks.141 The direct and conflicting interest that banks faced—
both as input providers and as users with contracts pegged to the 
benchmark—exposed the benchmarks to distortion.  
The transparency of the WM/R methodology also exposed the 
benchmarks to manipulation. Market actors knew the basis of the 
benchmarks’ calculations and, as such, were able to engage in well-timed 
trading in order to distort them. Here, by tailoring their trading activity, such 
as executing multiple smaller trades during the fix window, traders used the 
transparency of the benchmarks to undermine their integrity. Being 
transaction-based, therefore, is not enough to inoculate these benchmarks 
from manipulation, particularly when the markets know how the 
administrator will use the transaction data to compile them. It is necessary to 
consider how transparency may be achieved without undermining 
benchmark and market integrity and whether an ex post regulatory 
framework can reasonably accomplish this.  
Additionally, the WM/R rates are heavily integrated into the financial 
market, which magnified the impact of their distortion. As discussed above, 
WM/R rates are incorporated in trillions of dollars’ worth of transactions.142 
The widespread adoption of the WM/R rates as reflective of the foreign 
exchange market makes them an attractive target for manipulation. This also 
means that the broader markets are threatened because of the benchmarks’ 
manipulation. Unlike traditional market manipulation schemes, the scope of 
the impact from manipulating the foreign exchange benchmarks is vast. The 
market-wide implications of these schemes call into question whether 
enforcement proceedings after-the-fact are the best way to protect the market.  
Liquidity also factored into the ability of traders to manipulate the 
benchmark in the long term. The currency markets are notoriously opaque 
and most trades are over the counter.143 Given the numerous venues in which 
trading is occurring in any currency, the market lacks a globally consolidated 
 
 141. See id. (“Deutsche Bank AG, based in Frankfurt, is No. 1, with a 15.2 percent share, 
followed by New York-based Citigroup Inc. with 14.9 percent, London-based Barclays Plc with 
10.2 percent and Zurich-based UBS AG with 10.1 percent.”). 
 142. Id. (noting that rates are used to set the value of trillions of dollars of investments). 
 143. See FOREIGN EXCH. PROF’LS ASS’N, supra note 126, at 3–4 (noting that most currency 
trades are executed between individual bankers and banks directly, as opposed to executing 
trades via exchanges); Vaughan et al., supra note 16 (noting the same trend). 
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exchange rate for currencies, so the WM/R rates are the closest thing the 
markets have.144 The WM/R rates enhanced the liquidity of the foreign-
currency markets because instruments that reference the benchmarks are 
more tradable and have lower transaction costs. The cost of the liquidity that 
accompanies the WM/R rates is that market discipline is not possible. Even 
when other market actors know that banks have manipulated the 
benchmarks, they will continue to use them because there are no alternatives. 
Investors have even gone as far as indicating that they would use the WM/R 
rates even if they were rigged because they are “more convenient and often 
cheaper than seeking [multiple] quotes from individual banks.”145 Once 
again, this demonstrates the difficulty in expecting the markets to act as a 
bulwark against potential benchmark manipulation. The cost of attaining 
liquidity is that market actors are unwilling to abandon the benchmark even 
if it is distorted. This, therefore, poses a constant threat to the maintenance 
of overall market efficiency and integrity that ex post enforcement may not 
adequately address.  
The extreme conflicts that pervaded the IBORs may suggest, on their 
surface, that the manipulation of the interest rate benchmarks was an 
anomaly. But when regulators revealed another multi-year manipulation 
scheme, classifying the IBORs manipulation schemes as a one-off event 
became less realistic. The foreign exchange benchmark manipulation scheme 
once again demonstrated that conflict of interest, transparency, market 
integration, and liquidity all play a role in benchmark manipulation. The 
successful long-term manipulation of yet another fundamental market metric 
highlights the shortcomings of the existing enforcement-only model in 
deterring benchmark manipulation.  
C. CRUDE OIL 
Similar to the foreign exchange markets, the oil markets are opaque, and 
participants conduct most transactions bilaterally over the counter among a 
small number of traders.146 In the absence of exchange trading, the oil market 
depends on price-reporting agencies for the price of oil.147 The prices these 
agencies report serve as the reference price for physical and derivative 
 
 144. See Vaughan et al., supra note 16 (noting that “the WM/[R] rates provide standardized 
benchmarks allowing fund managers to value holdings and assess performance”).  
 145. Id.  
 146. See, e.g., ENERGY CHARTER SECRETARIAT, PUTTING A PRICE ON ENERGY: INTERNATIONAL 
PRICE MECHANISMS FOR OIL AND GAs 79–80 (2007), http://www.energycharter.org/fileadmin/ 
DocumentsMedia/Thematic/Oil_and_Gas_Pricing_2007_en.pdf; Andrew Tuson, Benchmark 
Manipulation—Price of Oil in the Spotlight, BERWIN LEIGHTON PAISNER LLP: EXPERT LEGAL INSIGHTS 
(June 20, 2014), http://www.blplaw.com/expert-legal-insights/articles/benchmark-manipulation-
price-oil-spotlight. 
 147. ENERGY CHARTER SECRETARIAT, supra note 146, at 80; Tuson, supra note 146.  
FLETCHER_PP_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 7/11/2017  1:08 PM 
2017] BENCHMARK REGULATION 1957 
 
transactions in the oil market.148 The main price-reporting agency for oil 
benchmarks is Platts, an energy news and data provider.149 Platts has collected 
and disseminated data on the price of crude oil for over 100 years150 and today 
is responsible for estimating the price for approximately 80% of the oil 
market.151  
Platts’s primary oil benchmark is the Brent Crude Oil Index (“Brent”) 
benchmark, which reflects the most heavily traded grade of crude oil in the 
physical market.152 To set the Brent benchmark, Platts uses trades done within 
a preset window, known as the market-on-close (“MOC”) window.153 
Administrators calculate only trades done within a 30-minute period starting 
at 4:00 p.m. GMT each day into the benchmark.154 Notably, data contributors 
provide information on transactions on a voluntary basis and may (legally) do 
so selectively.155 Consequently, administrators include only a small number of 
trades in the benchmark’s calculations, and market participants may 
selectively submit these trades to influence the benchmark. 
The nature and basis on which input providers contribute data to the oil 
benchmark enables them to distort the market. Because they do not need to 
submit all transactions in crude oil, traders may strategically submit data in 
the MOC window. Traders can and do selectively contribute data to the price-
reporting agencies that would move the benchmark to benefit derivatives 
positions that reference it. In recent years, U.S. and European regulators have 
launched investigations to determine whether traders have engaged in these 
 
 148. Tuson, supra note 146.  
 149. Id.; see also Alexander Kwiatkowski & Winnie Zhu, EU Oil Manipulation Probe Shines Light on 
Platts Pricing, BLOOMBERG (May 15, 2013, 12:21 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/ 
2013-05-15/eu-oil-manipulation-probe-shines-light-on-platts-pricing-window.  
 150. See Our History, PLATTS, http://www.platts.com/history (last visited Apr. 16, 2017) 
(stating that Warren Platt started his publishing venture in 1909). 
 151. Tuson, supra note 146. 
 152. Sandy Fielden, Crazy Little Crude Called Brent—The Physical Trading Market, OIL & GAS FIN. J. 
(Mar. 12, 2013), http://www.ogfj.com/articles/2013/03/crazy-little-crude-called-brent-the-physical-
trading-market.html; see Daniel Kurt, Understanding Benchmark Oils: Brent Blend, WTI and Dubai, 
INVESTOPEDIA (Dec. 24, 2015, 10:12 AM), http://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/102314/ 
understanding-benchmark-oils-brent-blend-wti-and-dubai.asp (“Roughly two-thirds of all crude 
contracts around the world reference Brent Blend, making it the most widely used marker of all.”). 
 153. See PLATTS, EDITORIAL GUIDELINES AND METHODOLOGIES: EUROPEAN OIL PRODUCTS  
2–3 (2011), https://perma.cc/3UDR-CJMM?type=pdf (describing changes to the market on close 
assessment process). 
 154. See id. (describing assessment timeframe).  
 155. Bassam Fattouh, An Anatomy of the Crude Oil Pricing System 33 (Oxford Inst. for Energy Studies, 
Working Paper No. 40, 2011), http://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/wp-content/uploads/2011/ 
03/WPM40-AnAnatomyoftheCrudeOilPricingSystem-BassamFattouh-2011.pdf (“Market participants 
are under no legal or regulatory obligation to report their deals to [price reporting agencies] or any 
other body . . . . Whether participants decide to share information depend[s] on their willingness, their 
reporting policies, and their interest in doing so.”). 
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tactics.156 To date, they have brought no charges against specific traders or 
price-reporting agencies for manipulating oil benchmarks,157 but the 
fundamental characteristics that differentiate benchmark manipulation from 
traditional market manipulation are nonetheless present. 
As with other benchmarks, conflicts of interest are inherent in oil 
benchmarks. Any company registered with Platts may post bids and offers in 
the MOC window for use in calculating the Brent benchmark.158 This includes 
end users with derivative and other financial obligations pegged to it. The 
ability of these actors to submit trades selectively further compounds the 
conflict, thereby increasing the likelihood of benchmark distortion. Market 
concentration, illiquidity, and opacity of the oil markets add to the potential 
conflict of interest. The oil market has very few players, so there is a significant 
overlap between input providers and end users of the oil benchmark. Platts 
depends on a handful of large oil producers such as Shell and British 
Petroleum to provide data on oil trades. It is those same companies that are 
the most prominent users of the benchmark.159 
Similar to the fix window for the WM/R rates, the MOC window provides 
transparency as to what transactions administrators incorporate into the 
benchmark, but this also exposes the benchmark to potential manipulation. 
Admittedly, the Brent benchmark has a wider trading period than the WM/R 
fix window, but it nonetheless encourages would-be manipulators to 
concentrate their trading in that narrow band of time to have the greatest 
impact on distorting it. Coupled with strategic submissions, this level of 
transparency undermines the integrity of the benchmark and exposes the oil 
market to manipulation.160 
The opacity of the physical oil market has resulted in oil benchmarks 
becoming the primary means by which market participants price oil-based 
financial contracts.161 Since the Brent benchmark dominates the market, 
participants integrate it into numerous transactions, especially derivatives. But 
they also use the Brent benchmark to price the majority of global crude-oil 
transactions on the spot market (i.e., cash market).162 This means that 
participants use the benchmark for both short-term and long-term oil-based 
 
 156. Scheck & Gross, supra note 18. 
 157. Id.  
 158. Kwiatkowski & Zhu, supra note 149. 
 159. Bob Van Vorins et al., Brent Crude Traders Claim Proof BFOE Boys Rigged Market, BLOOMBERG 
(Nov. 6, 2013, 8:31 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-11-06/brent-crude-
traders-claim-proof-bfoe-boys-rigged-market (detailing a lawsuit brought against BP and Shell for their 
role in manipulating inputs for Platts’s Brent Crude Oil benchmark).  
 160. RAYMOND J. LEARSY, RUMINATIONS ON THE DISTORTION OF OIL PRICES AND CRONY 
CAPITALISM 242 (2013). 
 161. See id. 
 162. Fattouh, supra note 155, at 24. 
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contracts, which replaces the “real” market price of the commodity.163 With 
the incorporation of benchmarks in even the spot markets, the market impact 
of distorted oil benchmarks would be quite extensive.164  
Financialization of the oil markets has amplified the need for a 
standardized valuation tool for pricing oil.165 Platts’s Brent benchmark 
provides the markets with this tool, and the markets are heavily dependent on 
it.166 As with the two benchmarks analyzed previously, the high degree of 
market reliance on the benchmark, in addition to its dominance as the 
primary benchmark in the oil market, means that the markets will be unable 
to move away from the benchmark even if its manipulators later compromise 
it. Thus, benchmark manipulation is likely to continue somewhat 
unfettered—even if the market is aware of it—because market participants 
will prefer a flawed, but liquid, benchmark over none at all. This is all the 
more true in the oil markets which opacity and illiquidity plague. 
  
**** 
 
As the above case studies demonstrate, benchmarks and attempts to 
manipulate them share certain fundamental characteristics that make this 
form of market manipulation meaningfully distinct from traditional market 
manipulation. Importantly, these differences mean that benchmark 
manipulation has a more significant impact on the financial markets than 
does traditional manipulation. But even in instances when it does not rise to 
such levels, benchmark manipulation has far-reaching negative consequences 
for the market. Delaying enforcement until after regulators have detected 
these schemes, as opposed to having a prescriptive regulatory framework to 
monitor the benchmark industry, is ineffective and puts the market at risk.  
Benchmarks are innately conflicted by their very structure because, at a 
minimum, most input providers are also consumers of their benchmarks.167 
Per this fundamental structure, those integral to creation of the benchmark 
are also those who are best positioned to manipulate it surreptitiously and 
benefit from it most easily.168 Benchmark manipulators, therefore, are able to 
 
 163. Verstein, supra note 25, at 242.  
 164. Scheck & Gross, supra note 18 (As the E.U. has stated: “Even small distortions of assessed 
prices may have a huge impact on the prices of crude oil, refined oil products and biofuels 
purchases and sales, potentially harming final consumers.”). 
 165. Fattouh, supra note 155, at 32–33. 
 166. Kwiatkowski & Zhu, supra note 149. 
 167. WHEATLEY REVIEW, supra note 100, at 15. 
 168. See Olli E. Kangas, Self-Interest and the Common Good: The Impact of Norms, Selfishness and 
Context in Social Policy Opinions, 26 J. SOCIO-ECONOMICS 475, 476 (1997) (“The emphasis in 
economic discourse has been on the pursuit of self-interest, individual gain. The world view has 
been that of Homo Economicus, who at his/her most extreme heeds only the voice of the wallet to 
the exclusion of all other considerations.”); Michael Pickhardt, Some Remarks on Self-Interest, the 
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distort the underlying market without contending with some of the obstacles 
that limit the scope of traditional manipulation. For one, benchmark 
manipulation does not require the outlay of capital that traditional 
manipulation does. Would-be manipulators of a transaction-based 
benchmark will have to trade to influence the benchmark, but, as seen with 
the foreign exchange and oil benchmarks, transactions only matter if done 
within a known, limited time period. Accordingly, the investment required to 
distort the capital is significantly less for benchmark manipulation than it is 
for traditional manipulation.  
Furthermore, the inherent structural conflict enables manipulators to 
carry out their schemes undetected for years. Again, because input providers 
are consumers or because administrators may have a material interest in 
either input providers or consumers, manipulators distort the benchmark 
from within.169 Therefore, unless regulators are monitoring the benchmark, 
it will take years for them to detect that the benchmark is being manipulated. 
The fact that manipulators do not need to sustain their benchmark 
manipulation long-term to be successful also stymies detection because they 
may distort the benchmark for this week or this month, but not do so next 
month.170 A single instance of benchmark manipulation could reap rewards 
across numerous derivative contracts, if the wrongdoers perform their 
manipulation on an optimal day.171 The conflicted structure of benchmarks 
and the attendant consequences of exploiting these conflicts, therefore, 
expose benchmarks to likely manipulation that, unlike traditional 
manipulation, is not limited by high capital investments and ease of detection. 
The paradox of transparency also significantly affects benchmark 
manipulation. The markets rely on a benchmark to the extent they believe it 
accurately reflects the market for the underlying. To demonstrate this, 
benchmark administrators must provide some information about how they 
calculate the benchmark and compile inputs. As the above three case studies 
demonstrate, manipulators use the information provided to undermine the 
benchmark even though the level of their disclosures varies. With interest rate 
benchmarks, for example, knowing how administrators used submissions 
allowed wrongdoers to tailor their manipulation tactics to maximize their 
impact on the benchmark. As the examples of the foreign exchange and oil 
benchmark demonstrate, this remains true even for transaction-based 
benchmarks. Whereas transparency allowed for easier detection of traditional 
 
Historical Schools and the Evolution of the Theory of Public Goods, 32 J. ECON. STUD. 275, 276 (2005) 
(“[T]he modern theory of public goods rests entirely on the self-interest hypothesis.”). 
 169. DEUTSCHE BÖRSE GRP., supra note 80, at 10. 
 170. Of course, the profitability of their malfeasance will be greater if the manipulators are 
consistent with their schemes, but such continuity is not necessary for profitability.  
 171. “Optimal” here refers to the day on which the derivative is valued, as stipulated in the 
contract. 
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market manipulation schemes, transparency in benchmarks augments the 
capacity of traders to distort the markets successfully. Addressing the 
repercussions of this transparency paradox requires regulatory intervention 
on an ex ante basis to minimize repeated blows to market integrity. 
The widespread integration of benchmarks into the financial markets is 
also important for determining whether an enforcement-based regulatory 
regime is adequate. The more market actors widely adopt a benchmark, the 
more concerning its manipulation is to the efficiency and stability of the 
overall financial market.172 This is emphasized by the dependence of 
derivatives on benchmarks.173 According to one study, over 90% of exchange-
traded derivatives reference an interest rate benchmark.174 This means that 
when a trader manipulates a benchmark for personal profit, the impact of her 
machinations does not end with her and her direct counterparties. Rather, 
they impact every derivative contract that references the benchmark, 
regardless of whether the manipulator intended to target it. This is in stark 
contrast to traditional manipulation schemes that affect a single stock or 
commodity. Integrating benchmarks into derivative and other financial 
instruments, therefore, transforms benchmark manipulation into a 
significant impediment to market integrity and efficiency or, at worst, a 
potential source of systemic risk.175 
Finally, a significant difference between traditional and benchmark 
manipulation is the ability of market forces to limit them. With the former, 
natural forces of supply and demand limit the profitability of manipulative 
trades.176 But with the latter, market forces are impotent. As a benchmark 
“become[s] a powerful ‘basin of attraction’” within the markets,177 the market 
is less able—and less willing—to move away from the metric in the face of 
manipulation. When contracts widely reference the benchmark, the 
underlying becomes more liquid, attracting additional market participants to 
reference it and further increasing liquidity. However, as one benchmark 
becomes liquid, alternatives either fail to develop or are crowded out of the 
market.178 When wrongdoers manipulate the dominant benchmark, the 
markets are unable and unwilling to transition away from it, and, 
consequently, there is little to no opportunity for market discipline to deter 
 
 172. See generally Robert C. Hockett & Saule T. Omarova, Systemically Significant Prices, 2 J. FIN. 
REG. 1 (2016). 
 173. Verstein, supra note 25, at 226 (“Benchmarks are utterly essential to the operation of 
financial derivatives.”). 
 174. FIN. STABILITY BD., supra note 3, at 9. For other studies of derivative products that 
reference interest rate benchmarks, see id. at 8–9. 
 175. Hockett & Omarova, supra note 172, at 10–12. 
 176. See supra Part II.B. 
 177. See Duffie & Stein, supra note 108, at 195–96. 
 178. See Robert N. McCauley, Benchmark Tipping in the Money and Bond Markets, BIS Q. REV., 
Mar. 2001, at 39, 39–45.  
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benchmark manipulators. Benchmark manipulation will persist as market 
actors will value the liquidity the benchmark offers—even a manipulated 
one—over no benchmark at all.179 The cost of liquidity, therefore, is the loss 
of market discipline.  
Considering the differences between traditional market manipulation 
and benchmark manipulation in the aggregate reveals that the ex post 
regulatory regime aimed at deterring the former through enforcement 
actions is inadequate to address the latter. Given that benchmark 
manipulation (1) is difficult to detect in the absence of monitoring; (2) stems 
from the innately conflicted structure of the benchmark production process; 
and (3) can have serious consequences for market stability, a prescriptive, ex 
ante regulatory framework is needed. Part IV proposes such a framework.  
IV. BENCHMARK REGULATION 
As the prior discussion indicates, benchmark manipulation is 
meaningfully distinct from traditional manipulation. From a regulatory 
standpoint, treating them the same fails to regulate a significant source of risk 
in the markets. Therefore, a different approach is needed. Currently, the 
benchmark industry is largely unregulated, and regulators address 
manipulation through enforcement actions, when and if these actions are 
uncovered. In the face of continued benchmark manipulation, it is 
undeniable that regulation would be beneficial to the benchmark industry 
and, by extension, the financial markets. Regulation would safeguard 
benchmark integrity, as well as market integrity, efficiency, and stability.  
Former CFTC Chair Timothy Massad, however, has rejected prescriptive 
government regulation of the benchmark industry, instead encouraging 
“alternatives to government regulation.”180 The question remains as to what 
alternatives there are and how effective they might be. As the prior discussion 
demonstrated, alternatives such as market discipline, enforcement-only 
responses, and industry regulation have done little to nothing to minimize 
benchmark manipulation.181 
 To be clear, the aim of regulating benchmarks is not to remove all 
possibility of manipulation from the markets. This would be neither feasible 
nor desirable. Rather, the goal is to minimize the impact and frequency of 
manipulative schemes so that benchmarks can be useful and accurate tools. 
Ex ante prescriptive regulation would best accomplish this. However, the 
timing of regulation is only one piece of the puzzle; it is even more important 
to consider the form it should take. This Article proposes prescriptive 
 
 179. Rauterberg & Verstein, supra note 23, at 43. 
 180. Timothy Massad, Chairman, U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, Remarks at the 
Natural Gas Roundtable (May 26, 2015).  
 181. See supra Part III.  
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regulation of benchmarks through a two-tiered framework of self-regulation 
and government oversight.   
This Part provides a theoretical justification for ex ante regulation, 
discusses the benefits of self-regulation, and outlines the two-tiered 
framework.   
A. IN FAVOR OF EX ANTE REGULATION 
The question of when the law should intervene to correct market failure 
is important and ongoing.182 While it is useful to delineate between ex ante 
and ex post intervention academically, they work together in all legal 
systems—particularly in regulation of the financial markets.183 For instance, 
ex ante laws would have no impact if there were no ex post mechanisms to 
enforce them. In describing an approach in these terms, the focus is on when 
to best regulate the conduct.184 Nonetheless, it is important to consider the 
point at which the government should intervene in the markets for regulation 
to be the most effective. 
As discussed in Part II, from a law and economics perspective, the issue 
of when to regulate conduct turns on three key factors: information 
availability, effectiveness of sanctions, and administrative costs.185 In the 
financial markets, another set of factors also applies—the effect of regulations 
on market integrity, efficiency, and stability. Regulators must balance all these 
considerations to ensure they do not emphasize one to the detriment of 
another. Considered together as a whole, all the factors listed above support 
an ex post approach to traditional market manipulation; however, the 
opposite conclusion holds true with respect to benchmark manipulation. 
One of the strongest arguments against regulating market manipulation 
ex ante is that government agencies lack sufficient information to craft 
optimal regulation to prevent manipulation without unduly hampering the 
market. This is not true of benchmarks. To start, benchmarks are innately 
conflicted, and, as this Article has demonstrated, benchmark manipulation is 
the direct result of these unchecked conflicts. Yet there is no regulatory 
oversight to minimize the impact of these conflicts on benchmarks or the 
financial markets. The link between conflicts of interest and benchmark 
 
 182. See generally Brian Galle, In Praise of Ex ante Regulation, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1715 (2015) 
(critiquing ex post regulation). But see generally Logue, supra note 36 (defending ex post 
regulation). 
 183. See Alan R. Palmiter, Toward Disclosure Choice in Securities Offerings, 1999 COLUM. BUS. L. 
REV. 1, 9 (“The Securities Act of 1933 regulates securities offerings to public investors by 
combining mandatory ex ante disclosure to investors and market intermediaries, administrative 
clearance, and heightened ex post fraud liability.”). 
 184. See Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 568–70 
(1992).  
 185. See supra Part II.A. 
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manipulation provides regulators with a sound starting point for regulating 
benchmarks because they can identify the source of manipulation.  
Knowing how conflicts potentially manifest in benchmarks provides the 
regulators with sufficient information to intervene to deter abusive market 
behavior. Whereas regulating traditional forms of market manipulation on an 
ex ante basis would require something akin to the predictive abilities of a seer, 
this is not the case with benchmark manipulation, where the conflict of 
interest problem is identifiable. Regulating benchmarks does not require 
perfect information, and financial regulators can acquire the additional data 
points needed to oversee benchmarks effectively. 
Professor Brian Galle supports these assertions about the level of 
information regulators need to implement ex ante regulations successfully. 
Traditional theory posits that the government should have perfect or, at 
minimum, superior information compared to market actors prior to imposing 
prescriptive regulation.186 Using a series of mathematical and statistical 
simulations, Galle convincingly demonstrates that the government need not 
have perfect information to regulate in advance; rather, modest informational 
gains can enable the government to adopt well-crafted, ex ante rules.187 With 
enough information—which can be as little as a single additional data point—
ex ante regulation is not as costly as others claim.188 For benchmarks, 
identifying the role that conflicts of interest play in benchmark manipulation 
is one such salient data point. Regulators, therefore, do not need perfect or 
superior information; they merely need “enough” information. 
A second consideration in deciding the timing of regulation is the 
effectiveness of sanctions.189 If regulators can use after-the-fact sanctions to 
deter misbehavior, then they are preferable to government intervention. But 
sanctions may not be effective if the perpetrator is judgment proof or if the 
sanctions are not imposed at a high enough level to deter actual misconduct. 
Galle identifies another instance in which ex post sanctions may be 
insufficient—when regulators impose them on actors who are indifferent to 
future incentives.190 This “[m]yopia [p]roblem,” as Galle puts it, makes it 
difficult to incentivize actors who discount the future with ex post measures.191 
Consequently, the government must regulate these actors ex ante in order to 
force them to account for the full cost of their decisions. 
 
 186. SHAVELL, supra note 39, at 575–76.  
 187. Galle, supra note 182, at 1729–34 (arguing that government ex ante regulation can be 
more successful than appreciated if regulators have access to “modest information” and the 
regulations are “flexibl[e]”).  
 188. Id. 
 189. SHAVELL, supra note 39, at 576–77. 
 190. Galle, supra note 182, at 1734–38. 
 191. Id. at 1734–35. 
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Actors in the benchmark industry are likely to suffer from this myopia, 
thereby necessitating a prescriptive framework.192 Because it is difficult for 
regulators to detect benchmark manipulation, a would-be manipulator may 
decide that it is economically beneficial and rational to manipulate a 
benchmark that is tied to large financial obligations. A trader could weigh the 
potential profits that she would earn if she distorted the benchmark against 
the low likelihood of detection and rationally conclude that a benchmark 
manipulation scheme would be a net-positive endeavor. Given the lack of 
oversight of the benchmark industry, the trader would discount the likelihood 
of being caught and sanctioned in her calculus, so threatening her with these 
fines would not necessarily deter bad behavior.  
The trader will also likely discount the negative externalities of her 
benchmark-manipulation scheme. In seeking to maximize her own self-
interest by manipulating a given benchmark, the trader impacts several other 
segments of the financial markets because market actors widely use 
benchmarks. When a rational manipulator weighs the likelihood and 
potential fines for being caught against the potential profits of her scheme, 
she will only count the costs to her personally and not the costs to the wider 
financial market.193 Both the trader’s lack of incentive to account for all the 
costs of her manipulation and the fact that ex post sanctions are unable to 
fully capture those costs argue in favor of ex ante regulation to minimize them 
up front.  
The third consideration is that of administrative costs. Professor Steven 
Shavell argues that if the costs to monitor and police before the fact outweigh 
the costs to identify and fine after the act, then government intervention 
should be ex post.194 Unlike traditional manipulation, it is highly doubtful 
that after-the-fact enforcement is administratively less burdensome than 
prescriptive regulation for preventing benchmark manipulation. Imposing a 
new regulatory framework on a market when none existed before does create 
new administrative costs, but any attendant benefits that would arise from 
prescriptive regulation offset those costs—particularly considering the costs 
that manipulated benchmarks exact from the markets. In addition, these 
benefits must include those that would accrue to the overall financial markets.  
 
 192. Benchmark manipulators are indifferent to future incentives for three reasons. First, they 
are able to reap profits from their manipulative conduct almost immediately, so they discount the 
future penalty of getting caught. Second, the lag in between manipulative conduct and government 
detection is so large that they are likely to discount the likelihood of being caught. Finally, 
benchmark manipulators do not have to internalize the full cost of their misdeeds because their 
actions impact other actors in the market, even those who did not transact with them. 
 193. Although it is true that traditional manipulators also only consider the costs of such 
schemes to themselves personally and not to the overall financial markets, the broader market 
costs in the case of traditional manipulation schemes are lower because of the limiting nature of 
these schemes. See supra Part II.B (discussing the limits of traditional market manipulation).  
 194. See generally SHAVELL, supra note 39. 
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Implementing a regulatory framework will minimize the likelihood that 
would-be manipulators will be able to exploit their conflicted positions 
possibly unnoticed for many years and to the detriment of both their 
counterparties and the market. By investigating potentially manipulative 
practices sooner rather than later, regulators will be able to stymie 
manipulative practices before they become commonplace and wreak havoc 
on the market. The lack of regulatory oversight currently exacerbates 
regulators’ difficulty with detecting benchmark manipulation schemes. A 
prescriptive framework for benchmarks provides regulators with a window 
into the operations of the industry, enabling them to identify problematic 
behavior early. This augments not only the integrity of benchmarks but also 
the integrity of the financial market.  
While regulating to deter market manipulation is a question of 
maintaining market integrity and efficiency, the large-scale integration of 
benchmarks into the financial markets means that benchmark-manipulation 
schemes also implicate market stability.195 In delineating between ex ante and 
ex post regulation in the financial markets, Professors Iman Anabtawi and 
Steven Schwarcz analyze the goal of each type of regulatory framework with 
respect to market stability.196 They argue lawmakers must consider more than 
simply the conduct of market actors in deciding when to intervene; rather 
they must also consider the impact regulation will have on the market as a 
whole.197 As such, the relative advantages of ex ante over ex post regulation 
relate to the desired effect lawmakers want to have on the financial system.198 
Specifically, ex ante regulations prevent negative financial shocks, whereas ex 
post laws mitigate their harm once they have occurred.199 
Although Anabtawi and Schwarcz were discussing regulation to mitigate 
against the systemic risk to the financial markets from the failure of large 
financial institutions, their framework is useful for considering how to 
regulate benchmarks because of the impact benchmark manipulation has on 
market volatility.200 The possibility and likelihood of significant negative 
market shocks, therefore, calls for ex ante regulation to best ensure the 
stability of the financial markets, per the Anabtawi–Schwarcz framework.201 
Addressing benchmark manipulation solely through enforcement actions 
 
 195. Market stability refers to less volatility in the markets and not to systemic risk. See supra 
Part II (discussing market stability).  
 196. See generally Iman Anabtawi & Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Ex Post: How Law Can 
Address the Inevitability of Financial Failure, 92 TEX. L. REV. 75 (2013).  
 197. See generally id. 
 198. See id. at 92–93. 
 199. Id. 
 200. This is not to argue that benchmark manipulation may result in systemic risk; rather that the 
Anabtawi–Schwarcz framework is useful in understanding when regulation can do the most good.  
 201. See generally Hockett & Omarova, supra note 172 (analyzing how and when benchmark 
manipulation may have systemic consequences for the financial markets). 
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leaves the markets exposed needlessly to a major, avoidable threat to market 
stability.  
Benchmark manipulation also compromises market efficiency if 
regulators do not meaningfully address it ex ante. Market actors use the 
information benchmarks provide to price and value assets, commodities, and 
securities. If these benchmarks are subject to ongoing manipulation, then the 
markets will be less efficient because actors will base pricing on incorrect and 
distorted information. Consequently, because benchmark manipulation 
impacts market integrity, efficiency, and stability to such a high degree, ex 
ante regulation is necessary to prevent the negative financial shock that can 
ensue from it. It is easier to establish parameters for creating “honest” 
benchmarks than it is to unwind trillions of dollars of contracts that integrated 
a distorted benchmark. An ex ante regulatory framework will allow for the 
former result more easily than ex post regulation.  
The design and structure of the regulatory framework is equally 
important to its timing. Before detailing the proposed two-tiered framework 
for regulating benchmarks, Subpart B discusses the benefits of self-regulation, 
which is a key aspect of the proposed framework.  
B. THE BENEFITS OF SELF-REGULATION 
Self-regulation is one of the hallmarks of U.S. financial regulation.202 
Stock exchanges, for example, have been self-regulating entities since their 
inception.203 Self-regulation is a useful tool that straddles the middle ground 
between top-down government regulation and the absence of regulation.204 It 
is also a particularly useful regulatory tool for complex systems, such as the 
benchmark industry, in which top-down, government-directed regulation may 
do more harm than good.205 
There are several primary benefits of self-regulation. First, self-regulation 
leverages the technical expertise and knowledge of the industry to craft a 
high-quality, efficient, and effective system of rules and regulations for the 
industry. Indeed, reliance on industry experts to design and implement the 
rules should result in lowered costs and increased benefits for the regulated 
industry.206 
 
 202. See CFA INST., SELF-REGULATION IN TODAY’S SECURITIES MARKETS: OUTDATED SYSTEM OR 
WORK IN PROGRESS? VI, 1 (2007), http://www.cfapubs.org/toc/ccb/2007/2007/7.  
 203. Id. at VI.  
 204. Saule T. Omarova, Rethinking the Future of Self-Regulation in the Financial Industry, 35 
BROOK. J. INT’L L. 665, 675–76 (2010). 
 205. Id. at 672; see also Julia Black, Decentring Regulation: Understanding the Role of Regulation 
and Self-Regulation in a ‘Post-Regulatory’ World, 54 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 103, 107 (2001); Orly 
Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 
89 MINN. L. REV. 342, 357–58 (2004). 
 206. CFA INST., supra note 202, at 5.  
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 Next, a self-regulatory regime is more flexible and more responsive to 
the challenges and needs of the industry than government regulation. 
Industry-led regulations are able to foresee and react to potential issues within 
their markets more quickly and easily than a government agency.207 Self-
regulation is also capable of being more expansive in its application than 
government regulation. As the industry imposes governing rules and 
regulations, it is not subject to a specific mandate, as government agencies 
are, that limits the scope of its authority. Self-regulation may, therefore, go 
beyond legal standards and impose higher ethical standards that benefit the 
entire industry.208 
By drawing private parties into participating in their own regulation, self-
regulation minimizes industry resistance to regulation and encourages 
greater compliance. Less resistance also increases cost saving because of 
decreased enforcement actions against members.209 Finally, self-regulation 
also reduces administrative costs of regulations. Industry resources will be 
used to fund monitoring of market actors and implementation of rules.210  
Although there are numerous benefits to self-regulation, there are a few 
noteworthy concerns. Critics of self-regulation posit that “private profit-
seeking enterprises cannot be trusted to regulate their own activities in a 
manner conducive to promotion of publicly desirable goals.”211 Given that 
self-regulation requires market actors to subordinate self-interest for the 
public good—an impractical expectation in a capitalist market212—some say 
it is bound to be an unsuccessful regulatory tool. Self-regulation also creates 
potential conflicts of interest in granting regulatory authority to an entity that 
represents the interests of the regulated. This raises questions of whether the 
self-regulatory body will adequately police its members in a socially beneficial 
manner.213 Finally, the industry may use its self-regulatory authority in an anti-
competitive manner to exclude future entrants. Instead of serving to monitor 
and police the industry, industry members may use self-regulation as a means 
of maintaining their dominance in the market.  
The serious negative repercussions that may result from a self-regulatory 
framework indicate that regulators should not leave the industry to regulate 
itself with no government oversight at all. In the absence of government 
 
 207. See generally Saule T. Omarova, Wall Street as a Community of Fate: Toward Financial Industry 
Self-Regulation, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 411 (2011) (describing the benefits of self-regulation in the 
financial market). 
 208. Stavros Gadinis & Howell E. Jackson, Markets as Regulators: A Survey, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 
1239, 1251–52 (2007).  
 209. CFA INST., supra note 202, at 5; Gadinis & Jackson, supra note 208, at 1251; Omarova, 
supra note 204, at 675–76.  
 210. Gadinis & Jackson, supra note 208, at 1251.  
 211. Omarova, supra note 204, at 674. 
 212. CFA INST., supra note 202, at 3.  
 213. Gadinis & Jackson, supra note 208, at 1254.  
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oversight, the disadvantages of self-regulation are more pronounced. Thus, 
the stick of government oversight is necessary to achieve the numerous 
benefits that can result from self-regulation.  
The regulatory framework this Article proposes seeks to strike that 
balance. It recognizes that granting the benchmark industry self-regulatory 
authority without additional oversight does not change the status quo of the 
benchmark industry and, indeed, may exacerbate the ills currently plaguing 
the industry by granting such authority with no means of checks and balances. 
But it also rejects the approach of government-directed regulation. Top-down 
regulation would do more harm than good for the benchmark industry and 
may even result in input providers withdrawing from the markets entirely in 
order to avoid regulation. This would only leave the market in a worse state—
less liquid, more opaque, and without any recourse. Consequently, a hybrid 
approach that recognizes the need for self-regulation with government 
oversight is the best framework to balance the interests of the benchmark 
industry against the wider financial markets and deter benchmark 
manipulation.  
C. THE PROPOSED FRAMEWORK 
This Article proposes regulating benchmarks ex ante by means of a two-
tiered self-regulatory framework similar to the SRO framework applied to 
national stock exchanges and national futures associations. Specifically, 
benchmarks would be subject to oversight by an SRO comprised of 
participants in the benchmark industry, as well as other entities or persons 
who are consumers of or contributors to benchmarks. In addition, the SRO 
would be subject to oversight by a financial regulator, either the SEC or 
CFTC—an additional step required to ensure industry adherence with the 
new framework. 
Because of the intricacies, complications, and diversity of benchmarks, a 
modified self-regulatory structure is better-suited for benchmarks than top-
down government regulation. Implementing a self-regulatory structure over 
the benchmark industry would address many of the factors that make this 
form of market manipulation viable and protect the wider markets from its 
dangers. To be most effective, government involvement would be a necessary 
component to ensure compliance with the self-regulatory format and, 
importantly, to mitigate against the conflicts of interest inherent in the 
industry. 
The SRO framework is a familiar one in U.S. financial regulation. Market 
participants in a given industry comprise the membership of its SRO. To carry 
out their governance responsibilities, regulators require SROs to implement 
and enforce rules that prevent fraudulent and manipulative conduct and 
practices and fulfill their duties in such a way that is not unduly burdensome 
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to competition.214 The SRO is the first-tier regulator—it monitors and polices 
members, maintains industry integrity, and ensures compliance with adopted 
regulations. At the second tier is the relevant government agency that oversees 
the SRO. 
The most well-known examples of SROs in the financial markets are 
those formed to administer securities exchanges. Before an equity security 
can be bought or sold on any exchange, the issuer of the security must become 
a member of the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”), the 
stock-exchange SRO.215 As a member of FINRA, the issuer is subject to 
FINRA’s rules regarding trading, corporate governance, and certain ethical 
standards. In return, FINRA gives the issuer access to either the New York 
Stock Exchange or NASDAQ platform so that investors may buy and sell its 
security.  
The SRO for the benchmark industry would operate in a similar manner. 
It would require market participants to register with the relevant benchmark 
SRO prior to trading on the platform from which the administrator culled 
inputs. To use the benchmark, the SRO would also require its end users—to 
the extent they are also input providers or large market actors—to register. 
Importantly, government oversight is necessary to prevent the conflicts of 
interest that plague the benchmark industry from becoming entrenched in 
the proposed SRO structure.  
The Subparts that follow address in greater detail the proposed 
framework for benchmark regulation, including the SRO, government 
oversight, and potential enforcement mechanisms.  
1. Regulated Entities 
Two necessary preconditions for the SRO format to work are that it must 
have the power to (1) require benchmark market participants to become 
members of the SRO and (2) exclude those who do not comply with its 
governance requirements from the benefits of the SRO. Without either, the 
SRO would become a voluntary association of some members of the industry 
with no authority over those who choose to flaunt its rules. In much the same 
way that issuers seeking access to the capital market must become members 
of FINRA, the benchmark SRO should require those who contribute to and 
administer a benchmark to participate in it and be subject to its authority.  
 
 214. Richard G. Wallace & Benjamin R. Dryden, Self-Regulation: Background and Recent Developments, 
33 ALI-ABA BUS. L. COURSE MATERIALS J. 43, 46 (2009), http://www.foley.com/files/publication/ 
974bee6c-9f0a-460d-b274-bc1297177dc6/presentation/publicationattachment/c6329027-7d7f-
45f7-b9a0-c2182ceaaa34/cmj0912wallacedryden.pdf.  
 215. Self Regulatory Organization, LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/self_ 
regulatory_organization (last visited Apr. 19, 2017). 
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i. Benchmark Administrators 
It is important that the SRO requires benchmark administrators to be 
members. As the conduit of information in the benchmarking process, 
administrators are a natural starting place for benchmark regulation, and they 
would likely be best able to monitor other actors. Administrators are well 
positioned to influence the behavior of others in the benchmark industry and 
to identify manipulative conduct because of their control over the 
benchmarks. They are also likely to be the most responsive to government 
oversight, thereby incentivizing them to police members to avoid running 
afoul of agency regulations.216 
A more difficult issue is determining which administrators the SRO 
should subject to its authority. For instance, should it exclude an 
administrator if its benchmark is a “byproduct” of its principal business217 or 
if its benchmark is not yet liquid? Such exclusions, if applied too broadly, may 
serve to undercut the entire regulatory framework for benchmarks, making 
the SRO impotent because of its limited reach. Another option would be to 
determine SRO membership based on the value of the underlying market that 
references the benchmark. This is the approach that the United Kingdom has 
taken in its benchmark regulations.218 However, it also results in some level of 
arbitrary line drawing that may not fully address the problems inherent to the 
benchmark industry.  
For the SRO format to be most effective, the SRO should require all 
benchmark administrators to be members. By making membership to the 
SRO mandatory, the authority of the SRO solidifies, and the industry as a 
whole is subject to across-the-board regulation. This approach would not be 
subject to arbitrary line drawing, nor does it require determining whether an 
administrator produces benchmarks primarily or as a byproduct. Instead, by 
requiring all administrators to be members of the SRO, this framework would 
oversee all benchmarks in a way that the market cannot. Furthermore, 
mandatory membership will benefit smaller, less-liquid benchmarks that may 
be able to establish their legitimacy more easily because of their SRO 
membership and observance of its rules.   
 
 216. Benchmark administrators are the only entities that are openly profit-seeking for the 
involvement in the benchmark industry. Consequently, they are most responsive to fines.  
 217. See Rauterberg & Verstein, supra note 23, at 26–31 (surveying the motivation for index 
production). 
 218. The Financial Conduct Authority (“FCA”) has authority to regulate eight identified 
benchmarks because of their market significance. Both administrators and contributors to these 
eight benchmarks are within the FCA’s regulatory purview. See Benchmark Powers, FIN. CONDUCT 
AUTH. (Apr. 22, 2016), https://www.fca.org.uk/markets/benchmarks/powers. 
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ii. Data Contributors 
The more challenging issue regarding the scope of the SRO’s authority 
concerns its authority over data contributors. The issue is further complicated 
because it differs depending on whether an input is based on transaction data 
as opposed to estimates. To the extent that administrators use estimates as the 
input for a benchmark, the concern is with authenticity, i.e., that conflicting 
interests or other inappropriate factors do not color the provided estimate, as 
was the case with the IBORs. Such estimates are difficult to verify because 
often the providers do not base them on actual or potential transactions. 
Notably, an administrator may not be any better equipped to identify 
distorted estimated submissions than a regulator. Nonetheless, to ensure 
accountability, the SRO should require the benchmark administrator to be 
particularly vigilant with estimated inputs. One alternative would be to enable 
the SRO to audit the submissions of contributors that they base on estimates 
to ascertain whether they follow a pattern that indicates possible distortion.219 
While input providers do not base the estimates on actual or expected 
transactions, they ground them in market conditions and information that 
the contributors should be able to document. Again, this is where the SRO 
demonstrates its value, in that it would not require contributors to disclose 
this information publicly, but rather to make disclosure to the SRO directly.  
Another option, which the SRO could utilize in addition to auditing, is 
to anonymize estimate-based contributors. For a benchmark such as LIBOR, 
in which the estimates submitted reflect a bank’s liquidity or ability to borrow, 
input contributors do not want to disclose any borrowing difficulty in 
comparison to peer institutions.220 With anonymity, a contributing bank 
would not have felt as compelled to fabricate its submission so as not to appear 
as an outlier among other banks, which was a motivating factor in the LIBOR 
scandal.221 Indeed, LIBOR administrators now anonymize submissions for this 
reason. If implemented together, these two tools would improve the integrity 
of estimated submissions for benchmarks and provide a needed means of 
verifying estimates to integral benchmarks. 
With respect to transaction-based inputs, the concern is different. The 
inputs of transaction-based benchmarks are susceptible to distortion to the 
 
 219. The SEC does something similar in detecting insider trading. It reviews trading data to 
identify trading that is suspiciously profitable in light of market movements as a basis for identifying 
possible insider traders. See Reuters, Here’s How the SEC is Using Big Data to Catch Insider Trading, FORTUNE 
(Nov. 1, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/11/01/sec-big-data-insider-trading. 
 220. See ECONOMIST, supra note 11 (“Banks that were weak would not have wanted to signal 
that fact widely in markets by submitting honest estimates of the high price they would have to 
pay to borrow, if they could borrow at all.”). 
 221. Cleaning Up LIBOR, ECONOMIST (Apr. 12, 2012), http://www.economist.com/node/2155 
2578 (“[I]n times of funding stress, no one wants to stand out from the crowd: all banks might be 
tempted to submit artificially low LIBOR estimates when pressure in the system rises.”). 
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extent that the benchmark focuses on a narrow, specified period of time that 
is known to the markets. As discussed above, informing market participants of 
the source of the data ensures transparency but also makes the benchmark 
susceptible to distortions from targeted trading behavior. To address this 
issue, benchmark administrators could disclose this information to the SRO. 
To the extent that administrators want to enlarge the input window or change 
it on a periodic basis, they could take these actions after appropriate 
disclosures to the SRO and not to the public in general. Again, there is value 
in transparency, but to the extent that it makes market manipulation more 
feasible, it has its limitations. But by disclosing the information to the SRO, 
administrators could achieve the benefits of transparency without 
augmenting the possibility for benchmark manipulation.  
2. Detecting Benchmark Manipulation 
This proposed two-tier framework takes advantage of the expertise of 
industry participants because they are better able to identify manipulative 
actions than a financial regulator would be if it acted without any industry 
input. Importantly, the SRO structure places the onus on benchmark 
administrators to detect and address distortion or face specific consequences 
from government regulators. The possibility of government sanctions for non-
compliance mitigates against this and incentivizes the administrator to 
monitor its input sources. 
Importantly, benchmark administrators are more likely to take 
complaints of manipulation from market actors seriously and take action 
against these manipulators. Administrators would also have an interest in 
policing other benchmark participants to continue their business operations. 
In short, given the absence of organic market discipline, the SRO format 
would simulate the effect and impact of market discipline within the 
benchmark industry. This would make it easier to detect manipulation and 
less likely for manipulative schemes to continue for a prolonged period. 
To further strengthen the duty of administrators to maintain the integrity 
of their benchmarks, there should also be an affirmative duty, imposed by 
SRO rules, that administrators investigate and report any suspected 
manipulation to the SRO and/or the government. If SRO regulations place 
this burden on the benchmark administrators, they would be more likely to 
be diligent about preventing manipulation because the SRO could find them 
liable if they are complicit in or willfully ignorant of manipulative behavior.   
3. Conflicts of Interest 
Conflicts of interest are a primary factor in benchmark manipulation. 
Unsurprisingly, regulations will not eliminate conflicts of interest in the 
benchmark industry, but the proposed framework will minimize their effects. 
The framework would address these conflicts of interest in two ways. First, it 
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would facilitate monitoring of them, such that regulators could address 
egregious conduct before it rose to the level of manipulative behavior or 
destabilized the markets. Second, the SRO would develop governance 
mechanisms that minimize possible manipulation owing to conflicts.  
The SRO will be better suited to monitoring conflicts of interest in the 
industry because it will be more aware of the types of conflicts that 
administrators and data contributors face, due to its experience with the 
market. The SRO will be able to detect conflicts more easily and quickly when 
manipulators are exploiting them to the detriment of the benchmarking 
process. Importantly, the SRO should be authorized to adopt and enforce 
codes of conduct that establish needed guidelines for addressing conflicts. 
Again, adherence to this code would be likely because administrators and data 
contributors must comply to participate in the benchmark industry and, 
importantly, to be in good standing with the SRO and, by extension, financial 
regulators.  
In developing governance mechanisms to address conflicts of interest, 
there are various approaches the SRO could adopt. At the extreme end of the 
spectrum, the SRO could implement a complete ban on conflicts of interest, 
such that an input provider or benchmark administrator could not be an end 
user of the benchmark. As discussed above, such a ban would be impossible, 
particularly regarding input providers and end users. Although a total ban is 
attractive because it would end the problem of conflicts of interest entirely, it 
would also very likely result in the end of the benchmark industry.222 
Another possibility is that the SRO could require administrators and 
input providers to disclose all conflicts to the market, so that possible 
counterparties would be on notice about them. This, however, is similar to 
how the markets currently operate, except that the administrators and input 
providers would affirmatively state the disclosures, rather than counterparties 
generally presuming them. While this may result in a small increase in the 
number of counterparties that become aware of the conflicts, it is not likely 
to have a significant change on how the industry operates.  
A better option would be to require not only disclosure on the part of 
administrators and data contributors, but to provide counterparties with the 
opportunity to waive the conflict for each transaction. This approach would 
improve on current practice in a significant way. By providing counterparties 
with the opportunity to waive (or not) the conflicts of the administrator or 
input contributor, this would enable consumers to decide whether to use a 
benchmark that may be conflicted or to use an alternative one. The 
transaction cost would reflect the counterparty’s choice, because the non-
conflicted counterparty would be able to demand a lower price for using a 
conflicted benchmark. Among the disclosure options the SRO could adopt, 
 
 222. See supra Part II.C. 
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this is the most suitable because it would also minimize the likelihood of 
benchmark manipulation.  
In addition to adopting a “disclose and waive” approach to conflicts of 
interest, the SRO should also impose structural changes to minimize self-
interested exploitation of conflicts. One way to approach the inherent conflict 
of interest in the benchmarking process is through imposing ethical screens. 
For an entity that wears dual hats with respect to a single benchmark, internal 
partitions between the parties can ensure the integrity of the process. This is 
the route lawmakers took to address the conflict of interest inherent in the 
initial public offering (“IPO”) process at investment banks.223 Specifically, 
analysts are prohibited from soliciting business for their investment banks or 
marketing IPOs under national stock exchange rules.224  
Separating those who contribute information to the benchmark from 
those who issue financial products that reference it would minimize the 
likelihood that improper motivations would taint the data contributed. 
Indeed, as part of its settlement order with Barclays, the CFTC required 
organizational firewalls between data providers and traders, but did not go as 
far as requiring a physical barrier between the two.225 However, to be most 
effective, these firewalls should be not only organizational, but also physical; 
that is, those with different roles in the benchmark process should be located 
in physically distinct spaces if they are part of the same entity. When combined 
with the separation of roles, this would decrease even the possibility of 
accidentally sharing information. 
4. Enforcement Mechanisms 
This Article focuses on the implementation of a prescriptive framework 
for benchmarks because without it, manipulation will continue to be 
commonplace in the benchmark industry. Yet self-regulation, even when 
coupled with government oversight, is insufficient without any means by 
which to enforce its rules. Without enforcement mechanisms, the proposed 
framework would hardly improve on the current state of benchmark 
regulation. That said, devising the appropriate penalties for manipulation or 
other abusive behavior is not straightforward. The effect of penalties on the 
behavior of those who distorted or abused the benchmark is important, as is 
the potential impact enforcement proceedings on the benchmark’s very 
existence. A multipronged approach, therefore, is the proper tool with which 
to address these complex issues. 
 
 223. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 15, 15 U.S.C. § 78a (2012). 
 224. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 501, 116 Stat. 745, 792 (2002). 
 225. See generally In re Barclays PLC, CFTC No. 12-25, 2012 WL 2500330 (June 27, 2012). 
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First, most administrators own the calculations and formulae that 
undergird benchmarks.226 If they manipulate a benchmark, what punishment 
would be appropriate given their ownership rights? As discussed in Part III, 
the more liquid a benchmark, the harder it is for market participants to use 
an alternative one—even if the manipulated benchmark’s credibility is called 
into question.227 If the SRO determines that an administrator has violated the 
rules, should it revoke the administrator’s license to provide the benchmark? 
Given that the benchmark is the property of the administrator, revocation 
may not be a feasible response and, undoubtedly, would be too harsh. Instead, 
it would be necessary to punish the offending benchmark administrator 
without destroying the benchmark’s existence. 
Sanctions must remain part of the regulatory arsenal of the SRO and 
financial regulators for punishing manipulative behavior. But, particularly if 
an administrator manipulates its benchmark, it should face disgorgement—
i.e., have to repay the losses clients suffered because of its malfeasance. Even 
though market actors cannot move away from the benchmark because of its 
liquidity, administrators would still be liable for their manipulative behavior. 
Furthermore, if the administrator is not the manipulator but could have 
reasonably prevented the manipulation, the SRO should once again hold it 
liable.228 In this instance, the liability may be less than actual, direct 
manipulation of the benchmark, but the administrator should bear some 
responsibility. Again, this would bolster the benchmark’s integrity by forcing 
the administrator to be actively aware of potential distortions of inputs to 
avoid its own liability. It would create a stronger sense of ownership of the 
benchmark that would then result in fewer long-lasting instances of 
manipulation.   
Second, benchmarks cannot exist without data providers. If the major 
players manipulate the benchmark, could the benchmark continue to exist 
without their participation? Once again, sanctions should play a role in 
punishing manipulators, but with these actors more is needed—particularly 
in light of the pervasive conflicts that they face. To that end, if a data provider 
manipulates inputs, the SRO should exclude it from providing inputs to the 
benchmark for a specified time. This would ensure that the data provider 
could not distort the benchmark going forward. As the SRO reintroduces 
information the manipulator contributes into the data pool, it should 
discount this information for an additional period. This would lessen the 
importance of the contributor’s data relative to the data pool, given its past 
 
 226. See Rauterberg & Verstein, supra note 23, at 16 (discussing Libor’s calculation methodology). 
 227. See supra Part III. 
 228. This is akin to the duty of oversight the Delaware Chancery Court articulated in In re 
Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 971 (Del. Ch. 1996). Known as the Caremark 
duty, it imposes on a board of directors a duty to monitor the corporation to prevent illegal or 
fraudulent behavior. Id.  
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malfeasance. If, however, the manipulators are the largest data contributors 
and their absence would significantly impair the benchmark, it may not be 
feasible to exclude them from contributing to it in the first instance. In this 
case, discounting their contributions may be more appropriate so as not to 
punish the markets twice—first with their manipulation and second with the 
demise or impairment of a significant benchmark. In this instance, the inputs 
these contributors provide should be discounted for a longer period of time 
to have a meaningful deterrent impact. 
Finally, with respect to both administrators and contributors, the SRO 
should require specific disclosures if they were guilty of manipulation in the 
past. It should give clients the option to request another benchmark, if 
available, given the prior misdeeds of the contributor or the administrator. 
While not many clients may choose to use an alternate benchmark given the 
value of contracts that refer to a liquid, albeit manipulated one, this option 
may return a bit more of the market discipline to the process. If a contributor, 
for example, makes numerous disclosures admitting manipulation of several 
benchmarks, it may seriously impact its reputation in the markets. A client 
may respond by engaging the services of another institution because of the 
seemingly pervasive dishonesty of the contributor. Again, this is how market 
discipline should work, but for the cost of liquidity. These mechanisms, 
therefore, would inject quasi-market discipline into the benchmark industry, 
making it at least more responsive to allegations of manipulation than it is 
now. 
Creating an SRO regulatory framework would address many of the issues 
that beset the benchmark industry and expose these critically important 
metrics, and the markets that depend on them, to manipulation. Government 
oversight of the self-regulatory schema would add legitimacy to the process 
and incentivize market players to self-police to avoid the heavy, punitive hand 
of the government regulators. Furthermore, the right balance of enforcement 
mechanisms would provide a new, different form of market discipline, 
offsetting the absence of actual market discipline. This process would also 
offer a lighter touch than that of the United Kingdom, which has adopted a 
government-driven prescriptive framework that excludes the benchmark 
industry from participating in its regulation.229 By engaging market actors in 
their own regulation, but subjecting it to government oversight, it would be 
possible to allow benchmarks to benefit the markets and minimize their 
susceptibility to abuse. 
In spite of the benefits that will accrue from an SRO framework, 
government involvement is necessary to counter the fact that the SRO would 
also suffer from conflicts of interest. A two-tiered regulatory structure that 
includes government oversight of the SRO would be ideal. A self-regulatory 
 
 229. See Benchmark Powers, supra note 218. 
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structure, when combined with government oversight, would balance 
government involvement against market interests. Financial regulators would 
be able to impose broad, overarching standards on the industry, but this 
regime would enable participants in the benchmark industry to have a 
meaningful say in their own regulation. The following Subpart discusses the 
contours of government involvement in the proposed regulatory framework 
in greater detail.  
5. Government Oversight 
Government involvement is required if benchmark regulation is to be a 
meaningful change from the current status quo. Government oversight of the 
benchmark industry would ensure that the SRO implements and enforces 
rules and regulations to improve the benchmark industry and the financial 
markets overall. Again, the relationship among the SEC, FINRA, and stock 
exchange provides a useful guide. In establishing an SRO for national stock 
exchanges, the 1934 Exchange Act does not trust the industry-led SRO with 
the ultimate discretion to determine which rules and regulations it ought to 
implement.230 Rather, it specifies minimum listing standards, requires that the 
exchanges adopt rules to govern their members, and gives the SEC general 
authority over the SRO.231 Thus, the SRO has regulatory jurisdiction over its 
members, but under the purview of the SEC. Consequently, the SEC has the 
sole responsibility for ensuring that FINRA fulfills its minimum regulatory 
obligations. It has oversight of FINRA’s rulemaking process, including the 
authority to approve or deny proposed rules and to abrogate and amend 
adopted rules. The SEC may also pursue enforcement action against FINRA 
for failing to enforce its own rules, and it may review disciplinary actions 
FINRA has taken against its members.232  
This tiered regime has two notable benefits. First, it ensures that the 
benchmark SRO is within the scope of government oversight. Government 
involvement in the benchmark SRO structure, albeit from the outside, 
ensures that the “watchers are being watched,” thereby improving the quality 
of governance of the industry overall. With the credible threat of government 
prosecution, the benchmark SRO is motivated to police and monitor its 
members, and, relatedly, the members are motivated to comply. Second, this 
regulatory format enables the financial regulator to use its limited resources 
more judiciously. Rather than seeking to monitor and police the myriad 
actors in the industry, the financial regulator can monitor and oversee the 
benchmark SRO and rely on the SRO to monitor the actors directly. The SRO 
framework, therefore, makes use of the authority of the financial regulator to 
 
 230. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 6, 15 U.S.C. § 78(f) (2012). 
 231. Id. § 78(s). 
 232. Id. 
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keep market actors in compliance without invasive government involvement 
in the industry’s direct regulation.  
It can be said that the format of the benchmark industry shares 
similarities with national stock exchanges,233 which makes the SRO format 
well-suited to benchmark regulation. Given the fragmentation of U.S. 
financial regulation, the overseeing government agency of the benchmark 
SRO could be the SEC, the CFTC, or the Federal Reserve, depending on the 
benchmark’s underlying market. While there are strengths and weaknesses 
for any of these regulatory bodies, this Article does not need to resolve that 
question. Rather, it is sufficient to say that the government agency with 
oversight of the benchmark SRO would perform its tasks comparably to the 
SEC in relation to FINRA. Government intervention in benchmark regulation 
would follow President Theodore Roosevelt’s foreign-policy doctrine: Speak 
softly, but carry a big stick. This would allow the SRO and its members to 
develop effective regulation for the benchmark industry without burdensome 
intervention from the government but nonetheless under its watchful eye. 
V. OBJECTIONS AND RESPONSES 
Regulating benchmarks will not be without its challenges. For starters, 
there are overarching concerns about imposing a new regulatory system on 
an industry that has never known one. Adopting a new system of regulation 
will impose costs on the markets and, possibly, increase the costs of using 
benchmarks. Yet, in spite of these drawbacks, the benefits of a two-tiered 
regulatory framework as proposed herein outweigh the costs. This Subpart 
addresses challenges to an ex ante regulatory framework for benchmarks.  
One of the first objections to a regulatory framework is based on the 
diverse array of benchmarks in the financial markets. Benchmarks vary widely 
in how they collect and calculate data and how market actors use them. These 
disparities mean that, while certain rules may be well suited for one category 
of benchmarks, they may not be applicable to others. If the proposed 
framework seeks to impose broad, one-size-fits-all regulations on the 
benchmark industry, it will undoubtedly burden some benchmarks—possibly 
to the point of extinction.  
The SRO framework this Article proposes would address this because the 
industry would design the adopted regulation by and for itself, making it more 
likely that the regulation will be appropriately flexible to accommodate the 
varying needs of different types of benchmarks. By combining the relevant 
expertise of the benchmark industry with financial regulators, the SRO 
framework should be able to find innovative ways to monitor the industry, 
 
 233. These similarities are owing to benchmark administrators acting as intermediaries for 
pricing information, in much the same way stock exchanges allow market participants to 
determine the value of traded securities.  
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such that the benefits to market participants and the financial system as a 
whole outweigh its costs. 
Given the intricacies of the benchmark industry, government regulators 
would need the insights of market actors to implement a robust regulatory 
framework. This is a common approach in financial regulation and would be 
beneficial with benchmark regulation as well.234 This is particularly true given 
the structure of the benchmarking industry, which is innately conflicted and 
obscures manipulative activities. Accordingly, government oversight would 
require the assistance of insiders to be effective. Furthermore, although the 
concerns of capture are valid, they should not exclude industry participation 
given the complexities of the benchmark industry.  
A significant concern with adopting benchmark regulation is the chilling 
effect that it could have on the industry. Opponents of benchmark regulation 
may point to increased costs that always accompany a new regulatory 
regime.235 These costs could force some benchmarks to fold, reducing market 
liquidity and transparency and increasing transaction costs. Such an effect on 
benchmarks would be significant because their popularity is directly related 
to the fact that they increase market liquidity and reduce transaction costs. If 
regulation were to impact these features in significant measure, their utility 
would be lost. 
Indeed, if benchmarks were regulated, there is a possibility that some 
data contributors would withdraw from the process to avoid regulation. If 
contributors refuse to participate in the process, this would weaken the 
benchmark. It is important to consider, then, the alternatives available if 
regulation leads to a mass exodus of contributors from the benchmarking 
process.  
One option in response to this issue is mandatory data submission—
requiring input providers to continue in that role after the SRO has been 
formed and has adopted regulations. For input providers already subject to 
the oversight of financial regulators in one way or another—such as banks, 
hedge funds, and mutual funds—it may be possible to mandate benchmark 
submissions. But these entities do not constitute the universe of benchmark 
data providers. Importantly, for non-regulated contributors, there may simply 
be no basis on which government agencies may compel data submissions 
absent legislation. Consequently, while mandatory data submission may work 
 
 234. See, e.g., Press Release, Morgan Lewis, SEC Requests Public Comment on Transfer Agent 
Regulation and Concept Release (Jan. 14, 2016), https://www.morganlewis.com/pubs/sec-requests-
public-comment-on-transfer-agent-regulation-proposal-and-concept-release; Press Release, SEC. EXCH. 
COMM’N, SEC Publishes Request for Comment on Regulation S-X (Sept. 25, 2015), https://www.sec. 
gov/news/pressrelease/2015-211.html; Press Release, U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, 
CFTC Staff Issues Request for Comment on Draft Technical Specifications for Certain Swap Data 
Elements (Dec. 22, 2015), http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr7298-15.  
 235. See Rimes, EU Council Adopts New Benchmark Regulation, THOUGHT LEADERSHIP (May 25, 
2016), https://www.rimes.com/insights/financial-benchmark-regulations. 
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for some benchmarks, it may not be possible in all benchmarks in which 
voluntarily submitted estimates constitute the inputs.  
Absent mandating data contribution, benchmark regulation could result 
in two distinct possibilities regarding the voluntary participation of input 
providers. First, contributors may continue to provide data in spite of the new 
regulation, particularly if the benchmark is liquid. Data contributors may 
consider it to be in their own interest to provide data to the benchmark 
because the potential costs of regulatory compliance are less than the benefits 
of using a liquid benchmark. Indeed, during a review of LIBOR post-scandal, 
market participants indicated that they would only be willing to continue 
contributing data to LIBOR if it were regulated.236 Furthermore, recent 
research has demonstrated that dealers and banks are ardent adopters of 
benchmarks because of the value of liquidity to their trading activities.237  
A second option is to allow the benchmark to cease to exist. The market 
would, in response, either find an alternate index or benchmark that met its 
needs, or it would develop the means by which to gather the same 
information. While this alternative may appear to be a high cost to pay for 
regulation, it is not so high as it might seem. If market actors choose to 
withdraw from the benchmark to avoid regulation, this would indicate that 
data providers may have been extracting rents from their participation in the 
benchmarking process (possibly through the ability to manipulate the 
benchmark), or that the benchmark was not valuable to the markets. In either 
instance, regulation compels the market to make a choice about the utility of 
the benchmark, which makes it stronger in the long run. 
In sum, while there may be some chilling effect on the benchmark 
industry, it is unlikely that there would be wholesale flight away from 
regulated benchmarks. In fact, the “cost of liquidity” would force some data 
contributors to continue submitting data if they had obligations tied to the 
benchmark. In spite of the costs that would accompany benchmark 
regulation, the benefits would outweigh the costs. Regulation would 
strengthen the information available and increase the worth of benchmarks 
to the markets. As the example of the United Kingdom demonstrates, 
benchmarks are able to withstand regulation—even when it is more onerous 
than the framework this Article proposes.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
Benchmarks are an integral feature of the markets, and their importance 
will only continue to grow. In spite of this, benchmarks remain curiously, 
dangerously, and firmly outside the scope of financial regulation in the 
United States. As this Article demonstrates, the conventional wisdom that 
 
 236. Bainbridge, supra note 113, at 813–14.  
 237. Duffie et al., supra note 74. 
FLETCHER_PP_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 7/11/2017  1:08 PM 
1982 IOWA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 102:1929 
 
advocates an enforcement-only regulatory approach to market manipulation 
does not hold true with benchmark manipulation. This is because of the 
innately conflicted process by which market actors use and consume 
benchmarks that enables their distortion to go undetected for many years. 
This is further exacerbated when a benchmark is liquid because market 
discipline is absent as a barrier against manipulation. Generally, market actors 
will remain loyal to a liquid benchmark because of the cost of using an 
alternate benchmark and/or unwinding contracts that rely on it. All of this 
calls for prescriptive regulation because of the inability of the market to 
protect itself—a classic justification.  
Because of the widespread integration of benchmarks into the financial 
markets, benchmark manipulation has far-reaching consequences for them. 
To leave this significant segment of the markets unregulated is concerning, 
particularly for its integrity, efficiency, and stability. As this Article proposes, 
a prescriptive framework that addresses the underlying causes of benchmark 
manipulation would curb the occurrence and extent of benchmark 
manipulation and, concomitantly, enhance the integrity of the markets. By 
incorporating those involved in the benchmarking process in their own 
regulation, the proposed SRO format ensures that the regulations would be 
flexible and responsive to the needs of the industry. On the other hand, the 
oversight of a regulator would minimize the likelihood of non-enforcement 
or industry non-compliance. While there are legitimate concerns that may be 
raised with this approach, it is undeniable that regulation is necessary to 
safeguard benchmarks from recurring manipulation and the wider financial 
markets from the consequences of such abuses.  
If regulators want to curb market manipulation effected through 
benchmarks, they must consider and eventually implement ex ante 
regulation. The two-tiered SRO framework that this Article proposes, if 
adopted, would augment the integrity of benchmarks and render them less 
susceptible to manipulation, particularly in light of the extent to which they 
are embedded in the markets. If the 2008 financial crisis taught the markets 
anything, it is that an aspect of the market may seem benign, but its market-
wide impact can be great. Benchmarks in many ways are similar: They are 
essential to a properly functioning market and heavily utilized. Yet, their 
oversight, control, and (lack of) regulation are in self-interested hands that 
bear no incentive to supervise them. Hopefully, it will not require a 
manipulation scheme with systemic consequences to force U.S. regulators to 
understand the necessity and wisdom of ex ante benchmark regulation. 
 
